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GIVING THE DEVIL THE BENEFIT OF LAW:
PORNOGRAPHERS, THE FEMINIST ATTACK
ON FREE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
John F. Wirenius*
I. Introduction
Until relatively recent times, it was easy to know where the battle
lines over the censorship of "pornographic" materials had been
drawn. Self-described progressives were adamant against such cen-
sorship, and conservatives in politics (and, frequently, religion) were
for it. That has been changed over approximately the last decade,
since the publication of Andrea Dworkin's Pornography: Men Possess-
ing Women.' Since then, a faction of the women's movement has la-
bored unceasingly for the enactment of laws regulating explicitly
erotic materials that contribute, in their view, to the degradation of
women. Catharine A. MacKinnon, who co-authored the prototypical
ordinance2 with Dworkin, has been one of the most vocal and influen-
tial advocates of this faction's position. Described by Professor Cass
Sunstein as "the most original and important voice behind feminism
and law," 3 MacKinnon has gone far in legitimating her view and in
winning adherents to her cause. Indeed, in a recent criminal case, the
Supreme Court of Canada essentially adopted the arguments set forth
by MacKinnon.'
* Associate Appellate Counsel, Legal Aid Society, Criminal Appeals Bureau, New
York City; J.D. 1990, Columbia University School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Vincent Blasi and Robert Amdur for their comments on a previous draft of this Article.
The author would also like to thank Harold Ferguson, Michael Fois, and especially the
late Calvin Schuh for their support.
1. ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1980).
2. The ordinance's text is set out and explained infra notes 11-15 and accompanying
text.
3. Cass R. Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARV. L. REV. 826, 829
(1989).
4. In Butler v. Her Majesty the Queen, 1 S.C.R. 452 (1992), the Supreme Court of
Canada held that the harm caused by "the proliferation of materials which seriously
offend the values fundamental to our society is a substantial concern which justifies re-
stricting the otherwise full exercise of the freedom of expression." In determining that
pornography as described by MacKinnon fell afoul of that rather elastic standard, the
Court relied upon MacKinnon's arguments that "if true equality between male and fe-
male persons is to be achieved, we cannot ignore the threat to equality resulting from
exposure to audiences of certain types of violent and degrading material. Materials por-
traying women as a class as objects for sexual exploitation and abuse have a negative
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The growing acceptance of this viewpoint raises serious questions
for First Amendment jurisprudence, questions whose resolution is
fraught with peril. While the enactment of the MacKinnon-Dworkin
ordinance and its upholding by the Supreme Court would not, of
course, cause the constitutional sky to fall, the arguments that are
winning converts and are acquiring an air of scholarly legitimacy are
inimical, I believe, not only to the Constitution but to any notion of
democratic-republican government. Both the premises upon which
MacKinnon proceeds and the direction in which she hopes to push
the law are utterly foreign to our concept of ordered liberty within a
political form of government.' While this does not of course prove
that the ordinance is invalid, or itself hostile to these ideals, it cer-
tainly raises the question of whether MacKinnon is a person whose
guidance in this matter is reliable. Furthermore, these premises and
goals do in fact reflect on the ordinance itself, as it can be shown to
serve them to the detriment of democratic-republican political values.
In order, then, to evaluate MacKinnon's assault upon the very no-
tion of political rule it is important to first set out her proposal (Part
II), and to scrutinize the arguments by which MacKinnon supports it
(Part III). In Part IV, the fundamental question which MacKinnon
poses, why we protect speech that harms, which is usually ducked by
a sheepish grin, a shrug of the shoulders, and an uncritical reference
to the First Amendment, is, if not answered, at least met square on.
The exploration of MacKinnon's argument should shed some light
upon this question in the specific context of the pornography issue
(Part V), and may lead to a conclusion.
In explicating MacKinnon's views, primary importance should be
given to the exposition contained in Feminism Unmodified6 and To-
impact on the individual's sense of self-worth and acceptance." Id. In explicating the
materials which violated the standard, the Court declared: "[d]egrading or dehumanizing
materials place women (and sometimes men) in positions of subordination, servile sub-
mission [sic] or humiliation. They run against the principles of equality and dignity of all
human beings." Id. As MacKinnon has long advocated, consent is no defense, but rather
"makes the acts more degrading or dehumanizing." Moreover, the decision is grounded
not in morality, but in the public perception that pornography is "harmful to society,
particularly to women." Id.
5. While "politics" and "political" have been used to connote anything pertaining to
government - the sense in which MacKinnon uses them - they specifically denote the
forms of government which rely upon the building of public consensus and the making of
decisions by a free electoral process. As Bernard Crick has written: "politics represents
at least some tolerance of differing truths, some recognition that government is possible,
indeed best conducted, amid the open canvassing of rival interests." BERNARD CRICK,
IN DEFENCE OF POLITICS 18 (2d ed. 1972).
6. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987) [hereinafter FEM-
[Vol. XX
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ward a Feminist Theory of the State.7 Her 1984 Francis Biddle Me-
morial Lecture, Pornography Civil Rights and Speech,8 (reprinted as
revised in Feminism Unmodified) and the ordinance itself are not as
frank about the values they serve. The ordinance is a proposed law
requiring popular support to secure passage, while the lecture is, in
MacKinnon's own words, "an argument for the constitutionality of
the ordinance" 9 first given to an audience not entirely sympathetic to
her views. Where the lecture and the ordinance conflict with her
more theoretical utterances and those directed at her supporters, I
give credence to the latter as being more representative of her genuine
views. Without any importation of lack of candor to MacKinnon
(whatever one may think of her views, she certainly does not hide
them), it seems clear that the thinker and scholar has a freedom de-
nied the advocate who can only press for as much as she can gain at
the present time. These more pragmatic, political expressions of her
views have a worth of their own, however, in understanding MacKin-
non's goals in that they set out "the vision of the First Amendment
with which our law is consistent."' 0
II. The MacKinnon-Dworkin Ordinance
A. The Proposed Ordinance
The MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinance defines pornography as:
the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through pic-
tures and/or words that also includes one or more of the following:
(i) women are presented dehumanized as sexual objects, things, or
commodities; or (ii) women are presented as sexual objects who
enjoy pain or humiliation; or (iii) women are presented as sexual
objects who experience sexual pleasure in being raped; or (iv) wo-
men are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated
or bruised or physically hurt; or (v) women are presented in pos-
tures of sexual submission, servility or display; or (vi) women's
body parts - including but not limited to vaginas, breasts, and
buttocks - are exhibited, such that women are reduced to those
INISM UNMODIFIED] (a collection of MacKinnon's lectures and articles incorporating,
inter alia, her articles concerning pornography).
7. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
(1989) [hereinafter FEMINIST THEORY] (MacKinnon's primary sustained work of juris-
prudential theory, this work covers some of the same ground as FEMINISM UNMODIFIED,
but does so in a more expansive, detailed framework, and in a more theoretical and sys-
tematic manner).
8. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography Civil Rights and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Pornography].
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2.
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parts; or (vii) women are presented as whores by nature; or (viii)
women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or
(ix) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, tor-
ture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised or hurt in a con-
text that makes these conditions sexual."
To pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause, no doubt, the or-
dinance extends to men and transsexuals as well as to women.
The "practice" of pornography under the MacKinnon-Dworkin or-
dinance renders the pornographer liable to civil suit under several sets
of circumstances. First, women coerced, intimidated, or fraudulently
induced into performing for pornography will have a cause of ac-
tion.' 2 Second, any assault or physical attack attributable to pornog-
raphy gives the victim of the assault a cause of action against the
pornographer.' 3 Third, "forcing pornography on a person" in "any
place of employment, in education, in a home, or in any public place"
creates "a cause of action against the perpetrator and/or institu-
tion.""' Finally, under the model ordinance, the production, sale, ex-
11. Id. at 1.
12. DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNS, THE NEW POLITICS OF PORNOGRAPHY 45
(1989). I use Downs's discussion of the ordinance only because it is slightly less diffuse
than MacKinnon's various discussions of it. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Pornography, supra
note 8. Downs's account is brief, compressed and accurate.
13. DOWNS, supra note 12, at 46. This particular provision is part of the Pornogra-
phy Victim's Compensation Act currently before the Senate Judiciary Committee. S.
1521, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter PVCA]. Like the MacKinnon-Dworkin
ordinance that can fairly be said to have inspired it, the bill creates a dramatic shift of
responsibility for sexual violence from the rapist to the publisher who allegedly "inspires"
the violence. One distinction between the PVCA and the MacKinnon-Dworkin ordi-
nance is that the PVCA is limited to speech which is "obscene" where the ordinance is
not. Id. at § 2(b). (Although this change frees the PVCA from the difficulties discussed
in the text accompanying notes 34-60, infra, the remainder of the objections to MacKin-
non's approach apply to the PVCA as well). While the PVCA does not contain the most
controversial provision of the ordinance - that which allows women who have not been
the victims of actual crimes to sue nonetheless "as a woman acting against the subordina-
tion of women" - the PVCA is otherwise in pari materia with the MacKinnon-Dworkin
ordinance. The House version, the Pornography Victim's Protection Act, deals with the
issue of women and children "coerced" into pornography. H.R. 1768, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 2 (1991). This bill contains no definition of coercion, and worse, explicitly pro-
vides that proof of various facts including "consent to a use of the performance that is
changed into pornography" by the plaintiff will not prevent a finding of coercion. Id. at
§ 2(3). See also infra note 28.
14. DOWNS, supra note 12, at 46-47. This provision is essentially a broader version
of Title VII protections against sexual harassment, extending that act's protections be-
yond the work place and educational facilities to any public place and the home. Com-
pare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988); see, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,
760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (female welder belonged to protected class under
Title VII; co-workers' conduct in posting pictures of nude and partially nude women in
workplace sexualized workplace, constituting actionable sexual harassment); Zabkowicz
v. West Bend Co., 589 F.Supp. 780, 782-83 (E.D. Wisc. 1984) (sexual harassment of
FIRST AMENDMENT
hibition, or distribution of pornography is discrimination against
women by means of trafficking in pornography, against which "any
woman has a cause of action hereunder as a woman acting against the
subordination of women" 5 regardless of any proof of individual
harm. Notably, this alleged civil rights ordinance is also entirely civil
in its impact. There is no effort to impose criminal sanctions under
any of the four provisions.
B. Why an Ordinance: The Harms of Pornography
The ordinance, like MacKinnon's other writings, targets two dis-
crete types of harm which are caused by pornography. The first kind,
which can be termed "direct," 6 consists of the coercion of models or
actresses into pornographic materials. This type of harm MacKinnon
claims to be endemic in the pornography industry, and MacKinnon
provides ample support for its existence.17 The best known example
cited by MacKinnon among her largely anecdotal, but nonetheless
telling, evidence of coercion is that of Linda Marchiano, who, accord-
ing to her own account, has survived the most profitable commercial-
ized rape in history. 18 This direct injury - so-called by me because it
is suffered in the very making of the pornographic product - is not
restricted by MacKinnon to actual violent coercion or even to actual
intimidation. She includes as coercion into pornographic activity the
situation of women who are desperate for funds and, in MacKinnon's
view, marginalized by society into accepting such degrading, low-pay-
ing jobs. Such women are forced by socially imposed circumstances
to turn to pornographers for funds.19 While these women are not vic-
tims in the conventional sense - they are not forced into their situa-
plaintiff included creation of hostile work environment by posting of "many sexually ori-
ented drawings" with plaintiff's initials on them).
15. DOWNS, supra note 12, at 46-47.
16. MacKinnon, who deplores the use of a solely linear form of causality, would be
most unwilling to accept this distinction. For her, one of the great weaknesses of obscen-
ity law and other First Amendment jurisprudence is its reliance upon "John hit Mary"
causality. See FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 7, at 206-07; but see H.L.A. HART & A.M.
HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 79-103 (1959) [hereinafter CAUSATION IN THE LAW]
(setting out theoretical formulations and basis for traditional common law approach re-
quiring finding of "proximate cause" prior to imposition of civil liability).
17. See, e.g., FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 127-34.
18. While Linda Marchiano's account of her being coerced into the filming of DEEP
THROAT has been disputed by others, including her co-star on that film, Harry Reems, it
nonetheless seems more useful to accept her view, for the sake of discussion. Even if it
did not happen to her, it plainly has happened to many others. For Reems's account, see
ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE 180-82 (1982).
19. FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 7, at 214, 242- 43; FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra
note 6, at 132, 205. The logic employed by MacKinnon to explore the coercive effect of
capitalism into pornography is irresistibly reminiscent of George Bernard Shaw's expla-
1992]
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tions by the pornographers themselves, but are rather exploited by the
pornographer - their consent is not meaningful in that they have no
other real option. Moreover, women's position in society is deter-
mined, according to MacKinnon, in no small part by the social atti-
tudes pornography fosters, the view that women are objects whose
sexual nature is accessibility to the male.20 Accepting this view, it no
longer seems outre to view "consent" to appear in pornographic
materials because of economic duress as coercion by pornographers as
a group.
Nonetheless, it is useful to distinguish between actual coercion or
intimidation of models/actresses by some producers or pornographers
(chilling instances of which are given by MacKinnon) and this alleged
prevalent inability to meaningfully consent to the activities involved.2
At the very least it permits the distinction between those pornography
producers who themselves create the forces which subvert the wills of
their models/actresses and those who merely take advantage of the
law of supply and demand to recruit a work pool. MacKinnon says
nothing about these latter that cannot be said of any employer in a
capitalist system; all employers rely on the fact that their employees
must find work to achieve subsistence. MacKinnon never addresses
the question why appearing in pornography is different from any
other unpleasant job that would remain unfilled but for the need for
funds by those with no other economically viable options.
Before proceeding to the second form of injury MacKinnon finds in
pornography, it is necessary to note some common ground with her.
Even the most fanatical advocate of First Amendment absolutism
would agree that cases of actual coercion or intimidation should form
the grounds of a civil action or a criminal prosecution. Indeed the
nation of prostitution in MRS. WARREN'S PROFESSION. See GEORGE BERNARD SHAW,
PLAYS, PLEASANT AND UNPLEASANT 200-06 (1905).
20. FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 7, at 139-52.
21. In her response to this Article, Professor Tracy Higgins calls this distinction
"gendered," arguing that "women are substantially more vulnerable both to economic
and to physical coercion." Tracy Higgins, Giving Women the Benefit of Equality: A Re-
sponse to Wirenius, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 77, 78 n.5 (1993). It is this very fact, upon
which I fully agree with Professor Higgins, that renders the distinction gender neutral.
These are two kinds of harm, and in society as it currently exists, women are more vul-
nerable to these harms than are most men. Since both of these harms are more oppressive
to women than men, it is difficult to see why distinguishing between them is "gendered."
The mere drawing of the distinction does not mean that one class (direct harms) is auto-
matically deemed regulable and the other (indirect/attitudinal) is deemed sacrosanct, but
rather that the concerns raised by regulation are not identic for both classes - which is
exemplified by the fact that I can agree with MacKinnon and Professor Higgins regarding
direct harms, yet disagree with them regarding attitudinal harms. For a discussion of
attitudinal or indirect harms, see infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
[Vol. XX
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films - or photographs thus created - may properly be declared to
be forfeit and turned over to the victim for destruction if that is her
wish, based upon the common law doctrine that one may not profit
from one's crimes. 22 As the film or photographs are the record of a
crime as well as its products, it is wholly consonant with the First
Amendment to say that such a record may not be sold for the profit of
the rapist. To that extent MacKinnon is setting up a straw man when
she writes that Deep Throat is protected speech: "Thefilm apparently
cannot be reached by her [Linda Marchiano] any more than by any-
one else, no matter what was done to her in making it. The fact that
Linda was coerced makes the film no less protected as speech, even
though the publication of Ordeal makes clear that the film documents
crimes, acts that violate laws in all the fifty states."2 MacKinnon
bases this straw man on the fact that Deep Throat has frequently been
held to be not obscene under the test set out in Miller v. California.24
22. "No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his
own wrong,.., or to acquire property by his own crime.... The maxim [is] volenti non
fit injuria." Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889); see also New York Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886); Barker v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y.
1984); Carr v. Hoy, 139 N.E.2d 531, 532 (N.Y. 1957). Surprisingly, MacKinnon never
relies upon this well established doctrine in support of the ordinance's forfeiture and
liability provisions, a lapse on her part which unfortunately deprives the best provision of
the ordinance of a useful doctrinal anchor. This doctrine's applicability has not been
affected by the Supreme Court's decision in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the
New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1992). In Simon & Schuster, the
Court struck as unconstitutionally broad a statute confiscating royalties from books pub-
lished by prisoners concerning their crimes. Unlike cases involving the coercion of wo-
men into pornography, these memoirs do not involve the commercial exploitation of a
photographic record of a crime - the direct fruit of the crime. Rather, they are the
prisoner's recounting of his or her own experiences from an individual perspective. Sig-
nificantly, the Court did not reject the general Riggs principle, nor did it strike all possible
"Son of Sam" laws.
23. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 129 (emphasis in original). MacKin-
non's footnote for the statement "DEEP THROAT is protected speech" provides references
to an earlier footnote listing cases ruling on the obscenity or nonobscenity of the film.
Some of the cases finding DEEP THROAT not to be obscene include: United States v.
Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 709 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1983); State v. Aiuppa,
298 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1974); Keller v. State, 606 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980). She
also gives several examples of cases holding the film to be obscene, including United
States v. Battista, 646 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1981) (upholding conviction under federal ob-
scenity statute for transporting DEEP THROAT in interstate commerce); United States v.
One Reel of Film, 360 F. Supp. 1067 (D. Mass. 1973); State ex rel Wayne Prosecutor v.
Diversified Theatrical Corp., 229 N.W.2d 389 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); People v. Mature
Enterprises, 343 N.Y.S.2d 911 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1973), aff'd, 352 N.Y.S.2d 346 (App.
Div.), modified, 323 N.E.2d 704 (N.Y. 1974).
24. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The constitutional status of DEEP THROAT is actually quite
murky. See supra note 23 and cases cited therein. In Miller, the Supreme Court created
a new test to determine whether or not given materials were "obscene." The test requires
the finder of fact to ascertain whether (a) the average person, applying "contemporary
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But coercion was not at issue in those cases. Those cases dealt exclu-
sively with the question of whether the film was subject to suppression
solely on the basis of its communicative content, and not on the basis
of any incidents involved in filming. In a system of case-by-case adju-
dication, the settling of one question, obscenity, adverse to MacKin-
non's position25 does not at all reflect on how they would rule on an
entirely separate claim, that of coercion. MacKinnon caustically
writes that "[w]hen a woman speaks for herself, her violation becomes
an atrocity and is therefore a lie. So Deep Throat is protected speech
and Ordeal is sued for libel."26 The fact that a libel suit was brought
over Ms. Marchiano's book Ordeal, while perhaps unfortunate, is
community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the pruri-
ent interest in sex; (b) the work depicts, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specif-
ically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic or political social value. 413 U.S. at 24-25. The Court explicitly rejected
the former constitutional standard that the work be "utterly without redeeming social
value" established in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). Miller, 413 U.S. at
23. The resulting balkanization of obscenity law, which requires publishers or film-
makers to be conversant with the obscenity laws of each state into which their work may
eventually stray, allows material which is constitutionally protected in one state to be
censored in another, under the national Constitution. For example, DEEP THROAT goes
from protected expression to unprotected filth depending on the court in which the de-
fendant finds himself. Compare United States v. Various Objects of Obscene Merchan-
dise, 709 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the film is not patently offensive to the
community of the "New York Area"), and People v. Mature Enterprises, 343 N.Y.S.2d
911 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1973), aff'd 352 N.Y.S.2d 346 (App. Div. 1974) (finding the same
film offensive in New York City). The impact of this balkanization of the definition of
obscenity upon the Senate's Pornography Victims Compensation Act, supra note 13, is
nothing short of staggering. The Senate bill is limited in its scope to reach only materials
which are constitutionally deemed obscene. S. 1521, supra note 13, at § 2(b). Under
Miller, the local community is not statewide, but regional - a town or perhaps a county.
See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974). Thus, in a federal cause of action,
under a federal statute, in a federal court, the threshold question of whether the Act even
applies must be answered with reference to a local community in which that court may
not even sit, depending on the vagaries of venue. Moreover, which communities' stan-
dards apply? Those of the community in which the materials are distributed by the pub-
lisher (those currently applicable), those of the community where the rapist or sexual
assailant acquires the materials (if he buys them not from a direct distributor, but ac-
quires them second hand) or those where the crime giving rise to the suit took place? In
either of the latter two eventualities, the publisher is held to the standards of a commu-
nity into which he may never have intended to distribute his or her materials, and with
which he or she may have absolutely no connection. The end result could well be that no
publisher would ever publish materials that could be found to be obscene even in the most
parochial community as the publisher could well be judged by that community's stan-
dards years after publishing. (The bill's statute of limitations relates to the date of the
crime, not of publication. S. 1521, supra note 13, at § 3(e)). This could occur even after
the materials have been removed from the stream of commerce, and have been in the
eventual criminal's hands for years - theoretically, possibly for decades.
25. See supra note 23.
26. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 11.
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scarcely probative; surely those whom she accused in print should
have the right to endeavor to contest such accusations in court.
This is not to say that our law goes far enough in protecting co-
erced or intimidated women; it does not. Both criminal prosecutions
and civil forfeiture actions based on directly coercive behavior are
sorely missing in our society27 and should be encouraged by all possi-
ble means, including statutory reform. An act based on the doctrine
that one may not profit from one's crime, which would allow victims
in the position of Linda Marchiano as described in Ordeal to sue for
destruction of the resulting materials and for forfeiture of the profits,
would be a valuable tool, so long as it was limited to cases of direct
coercion.28
The second form of harm caused by pornography can be described
best as "attitudinal."29 This harm is done to women at large through-
out society. It encompasses a wide range of injuries, from that of hav-
ing pornographic materials forced upon them, whether in the
intimacy of the home or in the work place, to sexual violence en-
couraged or caused by the eroticization of violence that is a pro-
nounced fixture of much pornography and by the objectification of
women, which occurs in all pornography. MacKinnon and Dworkin
argue that such desensitization to violence and resulting emulation of
violently sexual materials form only a small part of such a harm."
Pornography further reinforces the male image - and thus that held
by society - of women as objects and not as people in their own
right, as inferior beings to be acted upon. This in turn leads to the
legitimation of such attitudes, to the spreading of sexist attitudes and
27. One way in which it could go further is by enacting the Riggs v. Palmer forfeiture
hearing. See supra note 22. As this hearing would be a civil and not a criminal proceed-
ing (as indeed are the proceedings contained in the model ordinance), the plaintiff enjoys
the advantage of a lower burden of proof.
28. The Pornography Victims Protection Act seems not to be so limited. H.R. 1768,
supra note 13. First, while it does require "coercion" in order for models/actresses to
establish a claim for relief, it sets up a series of roadblocks to a defendant in seeking to
resist the plaintiff's claim. Id. at § 2. Among the panoply of evidence specifically listed as
not negating coercion, (others include a contract and monetary remuneration) consent to
commercial distribution of the materials is included. Id. If consent, apparently untainted
by coercion itself, does not serve to negate coercion (which the act does not define) then it
is difficult to imagine what would. If the Act is simply refusing to allow subsequent
consent to negate prior coercion, the result is simply the creation of severe evidentiary
problems for the defendant. (How can one defend against such a claim?). But it is possi-
ble to read the Act as saying that a consent apparently full and free at the time it is given
does not preclude a jury from later finding coercion, and that all makers of "porno-
graphic" materials act at their constant peril.
29. Again, it should be noted that these terms are not MacKinnon's and that she
would surely object to their usage.
30. FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 7, at 134-52.
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thus contributes to the perpetuation of male dominance in forms
much less crude than actual rape.3" The battle cry of "porn is the
theory, rape is the practice" is one believed by MacKinnon but it
oversimplifies her view of the harms pornography causes.
While MacKinnon would claim both forms of harm are equally at-
tributable to pornography, 32 the attitudinal harms are distinguishable
because they result from the consumers' use of the material and the
ideas or attitudes that come with the material. The direct harms, to
the contrary, are inflicted in the very manufacture of the pornography
and are not dependent upon the readers' or viewers' reaction to the
materials. The pornographer who is penalized for these indirect
harms is held accountable for the use the materials are to be put to,
regardless of whether he33 intended, anticipated or could have fore-
seen these uses. For example, if a woman is raped by an individual
"inspired" by a layout in Playboy, MacKinnon would hold Playboy
liable, despite the absence of any mens rea on the part of the maga-
zine's publishers. Whether desirable or not, this result is certainly a
new departure in tort law, and should be recognized as such. 34 That
the magazine may be put to such uses is foreseeable, MacKinnon
31. Id. at 134-38.
32. Id. at 206-07. Professor Higgins objects to this distinction between "direct" and
"attitudinal" or "indirect" harms because "[tihis characterization suggests at the outset
that the specific harms outside of coercion in the production of pornography are deriva-
tive, attenuated, indirect." Higgins, supra note 21, at 78 n.7. The harms are certainly
"indirect" and "derivative" in that they do not necessarily result from the production of
the pornography alone - they require another step: the reading or viewing of the materi-
als, and the audience's acceptance of the portrayed dynamic of male-female relations as
desirable. What I have called the indirect harms could not result were pornography pro-
duced by the carload but kept in warehouses; the direct harms could. The drawing of this
distinction does not mean that the harm is less - simply that it is different in kind.
33. While most pornography is produced by men, it should be noted that more wo-
men are becoming involved in producing and writing erotic materials and films, such as
Annie Sprinkle, Marilyn Chambers, and Candida Royale. Ms. Royale especially directs
her films towards a mixed or female audience. Also, collections of erotica such as the
KENSINGTON LADIES' GROUP BOOK OF EROTICA (1991) show a growing interest of wo-
men in erotica. That such widespread interest increasingly includes the "pornographic"
themes of dominance and submission is the contention of Nancy Friday. See NANCY
FRIDAY, WOMEN ON Top (1991).
34. Professor Higgins disputes this characterization, claiming that it "assumes too
much. If, as an empirical matter, pornography is exposed as a dangerous product, why is
it not at least foreseeable that it might inspire crimes against women." Higgins, supra
note 21, at 79 n.8. Of course, it is Professor Higgins who is doing the assuming here, by
postulating that the definition of a "dangerous product" should be expanded to include
the risk of an individual's internalizing a proffered sexual fantasy which includes a course
of conduct detrimental to others, by a mere showing that some individuals do. This is a
new departure, one that would hold it to be tortious conduct to entertain or to convince
another through representations of the desirability of a specified psychosexual dynamic.
Altering the nature of another's beliefs and desires by presentation of an alternative as
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might well assert, but it is scarcely the use for which it is designed,
nor is it a use which could be confined to pornographic materials. As
to the genuinely attitudinal harms, they are best evaluated after
MacKinnon's underlying premises are examined.
III. MacKinnon's Underlying Premises and the Ordinance
A. Contrasting Views: Free Speech Obscenity Jurisprudence and
MacKinnon
The first such premise underlying MacKinnon's scheme is that the
class of materials unprotected by the First Amendment should extend
much further than that presently recognized by the Supreme Court.
While there are several categories of speech that the Supreme Court
has deemed not to fall within the protections of the First Amendment,
pornography as defined by MacKinnon does not fit into any of them.
The only way, therefore, to constitutionally justify the regulation of
pornography is to apply the stringent test used for speech conceded to
be of social importance.
The somewhat curious notion that not all speech is "speech" for
constitutional purposes - that the regulation of some kinds of speech
does not even present a First Amendment issue - has its roots in the
1942 case Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.35 In Chaplinsky, the Court
opined that "there are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any constitutional question. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fight-
ing' words - those which by their very utterance tend to inflict injury
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."'3 6 The Chaplin-
sky dictum was reaffirmed in Roth v. United States.3 7 In Roth, the
Court found that the Chaplinsky category of obscenity was indeed one
of those classes of low value speech not protected by the Constitu-
tion. 38 From Roth to the present, the basic question of obscenity ju-
desirable or simply true has not previously been deemed comparable to selling that per-
son an exploding Pinto.
35. 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (upholding conviction for use of "fighting words" directed at
city marshal in public speech).
36. Id. at 571-72.
37. 354 U.S. 476 (1956) (upholding the validity of federal obscenity statute without
reaching issue of whether any particular materials were in fact obscene).
38. Id. at 484-85. Professor Higgins claims that this portrayal of First Amendment
jurisprudence is an oversimplified model, and that in fact the Supreme Court selectively
protects speech that harms. She points to the examples of employer speech during a
union election and commercial speech as examples of harmful speech which the Court
has deemed subject to prohibition upon a lesser showing of harm than the usually man-
dated compelling state interest. Higgins, supra note 21, at 83-85. In fact, the evolution of
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risprudence has not been whether obscenity is protected by the First
the Court's concept of "low value" speech has been a convoluted one, although it has its
genesis in Chaplinsky. The Court has added and dropped Chaplinsky categories at will,
and has introduced an intermediate breed of category, one in which the speech is given
some (although not full) First Amendment protection. Commercial speech is the classic
instance of this "semi-Chaplinsky" category. In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), the Court recognized commercial speech as a First
Amendment hybrid, a mixture of protected and unprotected speech, in an area "tradi-
tionally subject to government regulation." Id. at 462-63. The Court accordingly ex-
tended to commercial speech a lesser degree of protection than that speech fully within
the First Amendment's ambit, establishing this essentially new - albeit privileged -
Chaplinsky category. Id.; see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-73 (1976) (holding that state does not have plenary
power to suppress truthful advertising); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co.,
106 S. Ct. 2968, 2976-79 (1986) (upholding Puerto Rico's ban on casino advertising di-
rected at Puerto Rican citizens despite legality of gambling, and fact that advertising
directed at United States residents was permitted). These decisions do not, in my opin-
ion, show the Court acting in a principled or consistent manner. While it is as plausible
to create a new Chaplinsky category as it is to delete an old one (such as the category of
offensive speech eliminated by the Court in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971))
ideally, some logical reason might be in the offing. Just as the original Chaplinsky catego-
ries sprung wholly formed from the imagination of Justice Murphy, so too the category of
commercial speech materialized without any basis in principle.
The point that Professor Higgins misses in her discussion of these cases is that they do
not establish some holistic principle that all First Amendment jurisprudence is a balanc-
ing test, in which the Court measures the harm done and decides whether it is serious
enough to merit regulation of the speech. The first step it employs is to discern into
which category the speech falls - whether the speech involved merits full protection
(discussed infra notes 50-59 and accompanying text), no protection (the traditional
Chaplinsky categories), or is in this new intermediate category. Then the relevant test is
applied - that is, the Court determines whether the interest asserted by the state is
weighty enough to overcome the level of protection accorded to that speech. See, e.g.,
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. I do not endorse this multi-tiered structure because of
its complete separation from any traditional notions of interpretation of a constitution.
In his reservations regarding this categorical approach, I agree with Justice Stevens's
concurring opinion in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). The concept
that some speech is more equal than others finds no support in the First Amendment's
language and resulted solely from the sweeping dictum uttered in Chaplinsky without any
explanation. Moreover, the ease with which this analysis degenerates into the sort of raw
political decision-making that Professor Higgins claims should be made "overtly," Hig-
gins, supra note 21, at 87, further undermines the current approach, in my opinion. As
will be argued in Parts VI and VII, allowing the political process (or the legal process) to
determine who may or may not speak on the grounds that such speech may sway the
hearts and minds of its auditors, fundamentally disserves the underlying precepts of a
democratic-republican state.
The case of labor speech is readily distinguishable. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575 (1969) (cited in Higgins, supra note 21, at 81 n.18, 83 n.30), the Court
explicitly relied upon the fact that the challenged statute, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c), "merely
implements the First Amendment by requiring that the expression of 'any views, argu-
ment, or opinion' shall not be 'evidence of an unfair labor practice,' so long as such
expression contains 'no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit' in violation of
[§ 158(a)(1)]. Section [158(a)(1)], in turn, prohibits interference, restraint or coercion of
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization." 395 U.S. at 617. Even the
great First Amendment absolutist Justice Douglas recognized that speech could some-
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Amendment, but rather whether the materials at issue are obscene.39
This category of speech, obscenity, would superficially seem to be
the most likely to include pornography,' and is the type of speech
times form a component of an action, so closely bound up in the action as to be a part
thereof. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 454-57 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Such "speech brigaded with action" patently includes threats of the kind here involved.
In such a case, the speech's message is not censored, but rather the ban falls upon the
speech-component only incidentally in the process of preventing the action of coercion
through threat. Here, the regulation limits coercive speech only - threats, etc. - and
not argument or opinion.
Moreover, the Court treated the speech by employers as a case of two constitutional
rights - both stemming from the First Amendment (although the employee's right of
free association here was safeguarded by statute) - butting heads, and ruled that "an
employer's rights cannot outweigh the equal rights of the employees to associate freely."
395 U.S. at 617. Similarly, in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2745
(1991), the right of an attorney to speak freely clashed with the right to a fair trial guar-
anteed by the Sixth Amendment. Such genuine cases of constitutional guarantees in con-
flict provide the only legitimate exercise in "balancing" of constitutional rights in my
opinion. The general concept of equality to which MacKinnon and Higgins advert does
not exemplify such a case, as, in the conflict of pornography against the ideal of equalita-
rian relationships between the sexes, no role is played by the state, which by contrast tries
the defendant and licenses the attorneys.
39. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (reversing conviction under
state obscenity law since film involved was "not utterly without social importance" and
thus not obscene under Roth); Id. at 197 (refusing to even attempt to define obscenity,
Justice Stewart declares "I know it when I see it"); Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973) (reaffirming Roth's holding that obscenity falls outside of the ambit of
constitutional protection, and upholding conviction under state obscenity law to audience
concededly comprised exclusively of consenting adults); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973) (in upholding conviction under state obscenity law for selling "illustrated books,"
Court revised definition of obscenity, establishing "local community standards" test);
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (reversing state court finding that film CARNAL
KNOWLEDGE was obscene under Miller, Court held that nudity alone was insufficient to
establish obscenity); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (in upholding convic-
tion under Miller for mailing "illustrated version" of official report on pornography, held
that "local community" under Miller is not statewide standard but truly local in scope);
see also KENT GREENWALT, SPEECH, CRIME AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 304 (1989)
("The basic constitutional standards have remained those of Miller").
40. The only other existing category which could conceivably apply under MacKin-
non's logic is libel, treating pornography as libel of a group, i.e. women. Libel, however,
involves an attack, intended to be taken as true, upon the character of an individual. See
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (reversing libel judgment against New
York Times for advertisement allegedly libelling local sheriff on grounds that as a public
figure sheriff could not be libelled unless false statements of fact were made with "mal-
ice", i.e., either knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for falsity). In erroneously
claiming that we do not protect speech that can be rationally found to lead to harm,
MacKinnon in fact does rely on the sole group libel case decided by the Supreme Court,
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding a group libel statute applying to
racial epithets published by a white supremacist group in a newspaper advertisement).
As MacKinnon does not justify suppression of pornography as an example of libel, how-
ever, but as speech that harms, her reliance on Beauharnais, and its dubious status as a
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defined by the Court in Miller v. California.4 1 MacKinnon, however,
squarely rejects the Court's obscenity doctrine as applicable to por-
nography.42 As a result of MacKinnon's rejection of this rubric, and
her expansion of the definition of pornography beyond what has been
deemed to constitute obscenity, the categorical exception for obscene
materials cannot be used to justify the ordinance.43
That MacKinnon's approach sweeps far more broadly than Miller
is clear even without her explicit rejection of it; MacKinnon's ordi-
nance does not provide protection for materials with social value and
does not require that pornographic materials be looked at in their
context:
the requirement that the work be considered "as a whole" legiti-
mates something very like that on the level of publications such as
Playboy, even though experimental evidence is beginning to sup-
port what victims have long known: legitimate settings diminish
the injury perceived to be done to the women whose trivialization
and objectification it contextualizes. Besides, if a woman is sub-
jected, why should it matter that the work has other value? Per-
haps what redeems a work's value among men enhances its injury
to women. Existing standards of literature, art, science, and poli-
tics are, in feminist light, remarkably consonant with pornogra-
phy's mode, meaning, and message. 44
The implications of this passage are to allow for the suppression of a
wide range of work, broader, perhaps, than that which seems to fall
precedent does not provide the support needed for her ordinance. See infra notes 60-74
and accompanying text.
The Court removed the "profane" speech category in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971) (reversing conviction predicated on appellant's wearing of jacket with the legend
"Fuck the Draft"). Pornography as defined by MacKinnon also does not fit into the
"fighting words" category of Chaplinsky because of the Court's holding that such words
must, like libel, be directed at a single individual to fall under that case's doctrine. See
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (upholding disorderly conduct conviction for
calling public official "God-damned Fascist" and "racketeer").
41. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See supra note 24.
42. See, e.g., FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 150 ("The law of obscenity,
the state's primary approach to its version of the pornography question, has literally
nothing in common with this feminist critique. Their obscenity is not our
pornography.").
43. Professor Higgins chides me for my failure to explore MacKinnon's reasons for
rejecting the obscenity doctrine. Higgins, supra note 21, at 79. In fact, I accept MacKin-
non's rejection of the doctrine, believing with her that it is essentially irrelevant to the
discussion. Like MacKinnon, I further believe the doctrine is illegitimate, although my
reasons are based on its ipse dixit nature, and the lack of any grounds in the First Amend-
ment's language to support a corollary reading "except when the speech is offensive." In
any case, MacKinnon both rejects it theoretically and exceeds its scope practically, and
so the doctrine is unavailable to her supporters.
44. FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 7, at 202.
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under the strict letter of the ordinance, which was, after all, written in
the hope of gaining political support. It is unclear from the text of the
ordinance that the context defense currently built into the law of ob-
scenity4" would be viable; however the ordinance as written certainly
does not provide for such a defense." The elimination of the context
defense is no mere technical change in the law. By allowing even a
single passage deemed pornographic to result in the suppression of the
work at issue would result in the bowdlerization or loss of many
works currently hailed as classics. James Joyce's Ulysses for one
could not pass muster, nor could much of the works of D.H. Law-
rence, to say nothing of Milton's Paradise Lost.4 7 Indeed, public con-
cern over the possibility of censoring works of literary value has
wrung token concessions from MacKinnon and her supporters in at
least one state.48
More significantly, the reasons that MacKinnon believes justify the
withdrawal of constitutional protection from materials within the or-
dinance apply equally to materials that are not within the narrowest
reading of the ordinance; why is it only explicit sexual portrayal
which is subject to censorship? Why are other materials49 protected
even though they can lead to the same attitudinal harms as sexually
explicit materials? After all, if writing or depiction leads, through
45. See supra note 24.
46. In the most recent version of the ordinance to be approved by MacKinnon, Mas-
sachusetts's proposed Act to Protect the Civil Rights of Women and Children, it is ex-
plicitly stated that '[ilsolated parts [of the work] shall not be the sole basis for
complaints" under the trafficking provision, which allows women to sue on behalf of
women as a class absent any showing of individualized injury. H.B. 5194, Mass. 177th
General Court, 1992 Sess. § 2 (1992). Two observations apply to this resurrection of the
context defense. First, it only applies to the trafficking provision, and not to the rest of
the bill, thus allowing isolated passages to serve as a basis for suit under the other provi-
sions. Also, this modification is a classic example of the sort of concessions which MacK-
innon makes for political expediency. Plainly, this defense of context, while proposed in
Massachusetts, is not desired, and is only sparingly extended.
47. Milton's description of Eve as deeply sexual and "not equal, as [her] sex not equal
seemed ... yield[ing] with coy submission" is just one of the passages to which I advert.
THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 221 (Harris Francis Fletcher ed.,
Houghton Mifflin Co. 1941).
While perhaps instructive to list works which would fall prey to censorship under
MacKinnon's narrowed view of the First Amendment, it is also repetitive.
48. The Massachusetts Act to Protect the Civil Rights of Women and Children, supra
note 46, at § 2, has also limited the trafficking provision to "pornography made using live
or dead human beings or animals." This was done, according to MacKinnon, in order to
end the debate about whether the works of Norman Mailer or Henry Miller might be
suppressed. Tamar Lewin, Pornography Foes Push For Right to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, March
15, 1992, at A16. However, because of the possibility of liability for assaults inspired by
textual materials, the prospect of mainstream publishers being held liable for sexual as-
saults cannot be dismissed.
49. Ambrose Bierce's fiercely misogynistic but asexual writings leap to mind.
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means other than explicit portrayals of sex, to the creation of attitudes
that tend to subordinate women, how is the harm done any different
from that caused by a pornographic novel, which by definition cannot
involve direct harm, and yet falls prey to the ordinance? Such a line
of demarcation seems to be only a temporary concession to political
reality. Even without this gloss, MacKinnon's willingness to discard
the obscenity doctrine and especially the context defense alone dra-
matically expands the class of materials which fall outside the scope
of First Amendment protection.
B. MacKinnon's "Vision of the First Amendment"
1. Incidental versus Attitudinal Harms
A second premise is the concept of the First Amendment with
which MacKinnon believes her ordinance is consonant. MacKinnon
argues that the First Amendment protects speech only insofar as no
harm can result.
MacKinnon's gloss on the First Amendment is immediately diver-
gent from the traditional, however, in that MacKinnon does not dis-
tinguish between the attitudinal harms, those done by the
communicative content of the material to the values and attitudes of
the audience, and harms that are incidental in nature. Incidental
harms are distinguishable from the attitudinal harms in that they are
in no way dependent upon the audience's adoption of the beliefs pro-
pounded by the communication at issue. Incidental harms are not
inherent in the nature of the communication but rather are tied to the
specific context in which the communication is made.
Under the constitutional jurisprudence that has dominated since
1919, a compelling state interest must be shown to regulate communi-
cation that falls within the definition of constitutionally protected
speech.50 That interest must be based not on the state's fear of what
might result should the populace be won over to the speaker's view-
point, but rather upon the factual context in which the words at issue
are spoken, on "whether the words are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent." 5
50. Except, of course, in the case of low value speech categories already explored. See
supra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
51. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (upholding convictions under
Espionage Act for obstructing recruitment of soldiers during World War I on grounds
that speech involved, though normally protected, presented a "clear and present danger"
of causing a substantive evil that Congress was empowered to prevent, i.e., the spreading
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The classic case of falsely shouting "fire" in a crowded theater,52 for
example, is based not upon the inherent nature of the message, but
rather upon the factual context that makes a reasoned reaction to the
false message unlikely. An audience in the dark, given a frightening
buzzword in a situation suggesting impending doom, is likely to
panic, not to think. Shout "fire!" in a sun-lit, uncrowded meadow,
say, and you may cause puzzlement, but panic is less likely. The evil
to be prevented is not the substance of the communication, a false
message that there is a fire, but the chaos that would ensue in the
blackened theater. MacKinnon rejects this requirement that regula-
tion of speech be content-neutral and based only upon the factual con-
text in which the statements are made, seeming to fall back upon the
proposition that speech that exhibits a tendency to lead to unfortunate
attitudes or practical results should be subject to the censor - a view-
point long discredited. 53
Similarly, the test set out in Brandenburg v. Ohio54 (and its looser
ancestor, the clear and present danger test) prohibits revolutionary
advocacy (or indeed any advocacy of violence) only in a context
where a mob, swept away on a communal tide of passion, may well
act upon the exhortations of their goad without a chance to think
rationally. Mob psychology, as has been shown again and again, is
of disaffection and resistance to conscription in the ranks); see also Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (in addition to requirement that speech cause an imminent danger of
lawless conduct, speaker must intend to cause the lawlessness for the speech to be with-
out First Amendment protection). For a clear account of the development of the
Schenck doctrine from its rather speech-repressive roots to the far more protective stan-
dard embodied in Brandenburg, see Frank Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Dan-
ger": From Schenck To Brandenburg and Beyond, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 41. See also Tom
Hentoff, Note, Speech, Harm and Self-Government: Understanding the Ambit of the Clear
and Present Danger Test, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (1991).
52. Posited by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). See
supra note 51 and accompanying text.
53. See FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 179 ("[w]hat unites many cases in
which speech interests are raised and implicated but not, on balance, protected, is harm,
harm that counts"). MacKinnon thus suggests that any harm suffices, not specifying the
degree or the imminence of the requisite harm, nor a Chaplinsky category in which the
"harmful" speech is not subject to First Amendment analysis. The "bad tendency" test,
as it is called, was most famously endorsed by the Supreme Court in Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925) and in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). The Court
renounced the approach in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951), although
the version of the "clear and present danger" test which that Court erected was none too
speech protective. For the content neutrality requirement's evolution, see Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987).
54. 395 U.S. 444 (1968). In addition to the danger that the speech cause an imminent
danger of lawless conduct (essentially a restatement of the clear and present danger test
set out in note 51 and accompanying text), the Court in Brandenburg added a specific
intent requirement; the speaker must intend to cause the lawlessness for the speech to be
properly proscribed. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
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nothing like that of individuals.5 Under the Brandenburg test, the
state steps in when the members of a mob are not acting as autono-
mous individuals but rather as the agents of the speaker, carrying out
his or her will.
The same can be said of the infamous "fire" example, where the
automatic reaction of people in a dark crowded space conducive to
"herd" thinking is relied upon by the speaker. The speaker in this
instance knowingly provokes the audience reaction, making it in fact
his or her action. The harm MacKinnon would render actionable,
that of reinforcing or causing to arise values which the audience mem-
bers accept, and then consciously choose to act upon themselves, is
quite distinct.
In First Amendment jurisprudence, if thoughts or images are com-
municated in such a way that the audience - and in pornography's
case, it must be remembered, we are discussing a self-selected audi-
ence" - is confronted with them, but are not psychologically pres-
sured to act upon them right away, the law irrebutably presumes that
individuals are able to weigh, to evaluate for themselves, the merits of
these images or thoughts," although this presumption may be more a
political commitment than an empirical statement. MacKinnon does
not accept this distinction, and would hold the writer liable for the
use to which his or her ideas are put by any audience member5
55. See ROLLO MAY, POWER AND INNOCENCE 186 (1972) (distinguishing between
"fomented violence" from other kinds of violence, defining it as "a stimulation of the
impotence and frustration felt by the people at large for the purposes of the speaker.
Modern history is full of instances of how treating people like beasts leads them to be-
come beasts in the process"); Oberschall, The Los Angeles Riot ofAugust 1965, in DAVID
BOESEL AND PETER Rossi, CITIES UNDER SIEGE 96-97 (1972) (describing infectiousness
of violence in riot situations, but rejecting theory of complete irrationality of rioters, con-
cluding that "[wihile riot behavior cannot be called rational in the everyday common
meaning of that term, it does contain normative and rational behavior"); Wada and Da-
vies, Riots and Rioters, in JAMES C. DAVIES, WHEN MEN REVOLT AND WHY 63 (1971)
(characterizing rioters as primarily those with less stake in society; emphasizes "the sug-
gestibility of a crowd").
56. By this I mean that most consumers of pornography presumably buy it at an
adult book shop, which involves a deliberate decision to acquire or to view these materi-
als. To some extent this indicates a receptivity to pornography's message or at least a
desire to be exposed to it. Unlike experimental subjects, viewers of pornography in the
real world are predisposed to it.
57. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring) ("Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to
make men free to develop their faculties .... They believed that freedom to think as you
will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that
with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of
noxious doctrine . . ").
58. What of, for example, the deviant member of the audience? MacKinnon's ap-
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MacKinnon, in rejecting this dividing line, and maintaining that we in
fact do censor speech that can rationally be found to be harmful,
claims that the failure of traditional First Amendment doctrine is its
refusal to accept the harms of pornography as "harm, harm that
counts."5 9
2. Beauharnais v. Illinois
Beyond the cases involving Chaplinsky categories excluded from
the First Amendment's ambit by judicialfiat, MacKinnon relies upon
the group libel case, Beauharnais v. Illinois,6° which permits the impo-
sition of criminal liability for defamatory and degrading statements
about racial and other minority groups. Justice Frankfurter's opinion
for the majority in Beauharnais found libel of a group to be as unpro-
tected as libel of an individual, requiring only that the state be able to
show a rational basis for the prohibition of such speech (the lowest
level of constitutional scrutiny), 61 and not the far more exacting
"compelling state interest" normally required in free speech cases.62
Frankfurter found that the state had a rational basis for its censorship
of racial epithets in that "the Illinois legislature may warrantably be-
lieve that a man's job and his educational opportunities and the dig-
nity accorded him may depend as much on the reputation of the
racial and religious group to which he willy-nilly belongs, as on his
own merits. 63
As Justice Black wrote in dissent, the Beauharnais approach "de-
grades First Amendment freedoms to the 'rational basis' level" from
their usual preferred position."M MacKinnon's reliance upon this case,
largely discredited and possibly overruled by Brandenburg, which in-
proach disregards the attitude of the author toward the degradation portrayed. John
Fowles's THE COLLECTOR, for example, would surely fall within the terms of the Mack-
innon-Dworkin ordinance, yet the novelist's sympathy is entirely with the victim, whose
ordeal is portrayed in all of its horror. Perhaps a deeply ill member of the audience could
use the work as inspiration for similarly gruesome activities, and yet this does not seem to
justify its censorship.
59. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 179. MacKinnon claims that the First
Amendment does not extend its protection to speech that causes harm. Id. at 177-79.
See also FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 7, at 206-09.
60. 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding a group libel statute applied to racial epithets
published by a white supremacist group in a newspaper advertisement).
61. Id. at 258-62.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 263.
64. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 269 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas dismissed
the Frankfurter opinion contemptuously: "[i]t is a warning to every minority that when
the Constitution guarantees free speech it does not mean what it says." Id. at 287 (Doug-
las, J., dissenting).
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volved much the same sort of speech and found it constitutionally
protected, shows that she is not operating within the mainstream of
First Amendment jurisprudence.65
The speech regulated by the ordinance does not fall into any of the
past or present Chaplinsky categories, 66 necessitating under current
doctrine that the ordinance receive strict scrutiny. Indeed, even con-
ceding the continuing validity of Beauharnais, this remains the case.
As the Seventh Circuit noted in invalidating the MacKinnon ordi-
nance, the ordinance in not permitting context as a defense ignores
the requirement that "[w]ork must be an insult or a slur for its own
sake to come within the ambit of Beauharnais, and a work need not be
65. In Brandenburg, the speech held to be protected under the First Amendment was
a call for political marches to persuade "our President, our Congress, our Supreme
Court" to cease from "suppress[ing] the white race," threatening that should the "sup-
pression" continue, "it's possible that there might have to be some revengance [sic]
taken." 395 U.S. at 444-46. In Beauharnais, the speech held unprotected was a call for
the Mayor and City Council of Chicago to "halt the further encroachment, harassment
and invasion of white people, their property, neighborhoods and persons, by the negro-
through the exercise of police power." 343 U.S. 250, 276 (1952) (appendix to opinion of
Justice Black). In view of the nearly identical nature of the speech involved in the two
cases, it has long been believed that Brandenburg gutted Beauharnais of any precedential
weight. See American Bookseller's Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 n.3 (7th Cir.
1985), aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (subsequent cases have "so washed away the
foundations of Beauharnais that it could not be considered authoritative") (citing Collin
v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205 (7th Cir. 1978) cert. denied 439 U.S. 916 (1978)); see also
LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 861 (2d ed. 1988); but see Smith
v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916, 919 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
("[Beauharnais] has not been overruled or formally limited").
66. MacKinnon's rejection of the obscenity doctrine as a precedential prop and the
inapplicability of the other Chaplinsky categories are set out in Part III.A. See supra
notes 35-49 and accompanying text. Indeed, even accepting pornography as "low value
speech" under Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court has recently held that "these areas of
speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their consti-
tutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.) - not that they are catego-
ries of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles
for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content. Thus, the
government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the -further content discrimination
of proscribing only libel critical of the government." R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.
Ct. 2538, 2540 (1992). By declaring even low value speech entitled to neutrality in regu-
lation, the Court has substantially reworked Chaplinsky, which was itself predicated on
the exclusion of low value speech categories from First Amendment strictures, declaring
that regulation did not present a First Amendment problem. The same analysis used to
invalidate regulation of racist hate speech - a subset of the Chaplinsky "fighting words"
category - in R.A. V would appear to invalidate the Pornography Victim's Compensa-
tion Act. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Just as did the invalidated St. Paul
ordinance of R.A. V., the PVCA targets some proscribable (because obscene) speech, but
not all, and the distinction is drawn not on the basis of obscenity's "distinctly proscrib-
able content," but on the impermissible criterion of the material's viewpoint. S. 1521.,
supra note 13.
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scurrilous at all to be 'pornography' under the ordinance."67 That is,
a work need not be issued with the specific intent to defame and need
not be defamatory in context - requisites for liability under Beauhar-
nais' libel framework.
The only remaining standard, therefore, by which to judge the ordi-
nance is the hybrid of clear and present danger and intentional advo-
cacy of unlawful conduct created by the Supreme Court in
Brandenburg. As did the classic clear and present danger test of Jus-
tices Holmes and Brandeis, the Brandenburg test requires that speech
be "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to produce such action. '68 In addition, the speaker, must in-
tend that the imminent lawless result in fact occur.6 9
While MacKinnon does allege that the harm done by pornography
is clear and present, it is unclear whether she accepts the validity of
the clear and present danger test, let alone the more rigorous Bran-
denburg standard. 70 By failing to establish either an intent or an im-
minence requirement, MacKinnon's definition is simply not within
the constitutional framework that is in place in the First Amendment.
At times, she seems to recognize this, and presses for the creation of a
new Chaplinsky category for pornography. 7' As there is no case law
on this innovative point save American Bookseller's Ass'n v. Hudnut 72
- and that ruling has not ended the debate, but rather has trans-
ferred its venue to the United States Congress in a version of the ordi-
nance limited to obscene speech 73 - it is worthwhile to consider the
rest of MacKinnon's underlying suppositions, and what her approach
would mean to First Amendment jurisprudence if ever adopted.74
67. American Bookseller's Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd
mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
68. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1968).
69. Id.
70. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 179, 193-95.
71. See FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 166-67 ("Substantively considered,
the situation of women is not really like anything else.... Doing something legal about a
situation that is not really like anything else is hard enough in a legal system that prides
itself methodologically on reasoning by analogy") (emphasis in original).
72. 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1985). See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
73. See Pornography Victims Compensation Act, supra note 13.
74. Professor Higgins's critique of this Article, claiming that I focus exclusively on
"speech that falls within the core of the First Amendment's protection" in evaluating
MacKinnon's view, see Higgins, supra note 21, at 82, in my judgment fails to recognize
that after situating the MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinance within the present constitutional
framework, I seek to answer the question whether we should accept MacKinnon's invita-
tion to create a new Chaplinsky category for pornography. The rest of this Article essen-
tially grapples with the question of whether the values of the First Amendment, and, even
more generally, of our society, are enhanced or diminished by such a new category. It
seems to me that this question must be answered in order to reach a rational answer to
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C. "The Personal Is the Political": MacKinnon and Privacy
A third major pillar supporting MacKinnon's view is her absolute
rejection of the privacy doctrine. This rejection is somewhat unusual,
as the doctrine is the foundation of one of the women's movement's
shining victories, Roe v. Wade." Moreover, privacy and autonomy
rhetoric pervade the writings of more traditional feminists, and have
been the source of much of their ideological appeal.76
MacKinnon conceives of the privacy doctrine as a trap, a seduc-
tively liberating doctrine that in fact strengthens male dominance by
guaranteeing an isolated sphere in which to operate. By sanctifying
the home, where abuse of women is most pervasive, MacKinnon
writes, this liberal doctrine gives man a legal carte blanche to abuse
"their women" and "whip them into shape" behind closed doors:
For women the measure of the intimacy has been the measure of
the oppression. This is why feminism has had to explode the pri-
vate. This is why feminism has seen the personal as the political.
The private is public for those for whom the personal is political.
In this sense, for women there is no private, either normatively or
empirically. Feminism confronts the fact that women have no pri-
vacy to lose or to guarantee.... The doctrinal choice of privacy in
the abortion context thus reaffirms and reinforces what the femi-
nist critique of sexuality criticizes: the public/private split.... The
right to privacy looks like an injury presented as a gift, a sword in
men's hands presented as a shield in women's. 77
the MacKinnon invitation, as opposed to the original Chaplinsky approach of legislation
byfiat. The failure of the Court to explain why those classes of "low value" speech are so
denominated has deprived the jurisprudence of coherence and is not an error which
should be compounded by repetition.
75. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
76. For an example of such a "more traditional feminism," see VIRGINIA WOOLF, A
ROOM OF ONE'S OwN (1928). While Professor Higgins correctly points out that Shake-
speare's sister as envisioned by Woolf was not oppressed by the state, but by "social
constraints," Higgins, supra note 21, at 84 n.33, she forgets that one of the most onerous
constraints faced by the fictional Judith was her lack of privacy, from which Woolf took
her title.
77. FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 7, at 191; FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6,
at 102 ("The right of privacy is a right of men 'to be let alone' to oppress women one at a
time"). MacKinnon, it should be noted, supports the right of a woman to have an abor-
tion on the grounds of sexual equality, although the reasoning is to me somewhat murky.
Presumably, the right grants women a measure of power and anything that empowers
women in any way helps lead toward sexual equality. Oddly, MacKinnon further asserts
that the status of the fetus is irrelevant. The choice "must be women's, but not because
the fetus is not a form of life.... I cannot follow that. Why should women not make life
or death decisions?" she writes, blithely ignoring the fact that it is never considered legiti-
mate for anybody, male or female, to decide to end another's life in the interests of the
decider. See FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 94 (emphasis in original); FEMI-
NIST THEORY, supra note 7, at 186. Even a military officer, who makes life and death
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This rejection, however, seems to be premised on a rather gross mis-
understanding of the privacy doctrine.7" Indeed, if there is any consti-
tutional doctrine MacKinnon should find objectionable on these
grounds, it is not the privacy doctrine but rather the Fourth Amend-
ment's requirement of probable cause to support a search by the po-
lice of the home of a citizen.
Unlike the privacy doctrine of Roe, the Fourth Amendment prohib-
its police from forcibly entering a private dwelling place unless they
have probable cause to believe a crime is in progress. Thus, in cases
where probable cause is absent, the Fourth Amendment could be said
to prevent police interference in situations where abuse is going on
behind closed doors. Roe, however, simply establishes the right of
each person to control his or her body free of state interference as a
fundamental liberty that can only be infringed upon a showing of a
compelling state interest.7 9
MacKinnon assumes that the privacy doctrine protects spouse
abuse in the home, but this is not so. Meaningful, voluntary, consent
is a necessarily implicit prerequisite for any application of the privacy
doctrine.8 0 Roe and Griswold v. Connecticut s1 are based upon the pro-
tection of the consensual intimacy of couples (a protection later ex-
tended to heterosexual lovers).82 It is not based upon the nature of
the home, as sacred, although Justice Douglas' language about the
"sacred precincts of the marriage bed" can be read out of context to
support such a notion. It is not where the state seeks to intervene that
decisions, is not permitted to make them on the basis of his or her selfish interests. See
United States v. Dykes, 6 M.J. 744 (N.C.M.R. 1978); compare GLANVILLE WILLIAMS,
THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 197-205, 225-36 (1957) (arguing, in
discussion of therapeutic abortions, that even treating the fetus as a life, the doctrine of
"double effect" permits the saving of one life (the mother's) at the expense of another (the
fetus's) when not acting would cause the loss of both lives, and extending that logic to
situations where other social goods can accrue).
78. This misunderstanding is shared by Professor Higgins. Higgins, supra note 21, at
84-85.
79. But see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 119 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion
analyzing Roe treats abortion right as less than fundamental, although still important).
80. While the development of constitutional privacy doctrine is yet in its infancy,
with the bulk of the post-Roe cases dealing specifically with abortion rights, the requisite
of consent for any application of the privacy doctrine can be shown from the grounding
of Roe v. Wade and Griswold v. Connecticut in each individuai's personal constitutional
right to autonomy. With this as the essential grounding of the privacy doctrine, logic
dictates that coercion or undue influence of any kind would negate the doctrine's applica-
bility in a given case. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
81. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
82. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); but see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986) (declining to extend Griswold's privacy analysis to homosexual sodomy).
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makes Griswold special, but rather what occurs there.8 3 Domesticity,
as opposed to privacy, is what one has absent consent. The home can
be, and frequently is, a place of domestic abuse, but such abuse is not
in any way protected by the right to privacy. The right does not ex-
tend to couples as a unit, despite early language to that effect. The
right to privacy belongs to each individual, female or male and is
within the meaning of the term "liberty" as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment. First is the autonomous control over the development
and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personality.
... Second is freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life
respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the ed-
ucation and upbringing of children.... Third is the freedom to care
for one's health and person, freedom from bodily restraint or com-
pulsion, freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf.8 4
Absent a meaningful consent, one formed without fear or undue influ-
ence, to whatever activity the state seeks to regulate, privacy interests
are not in any way implicated. The fact that privacy-implementing
doctrines may not provide sufficient protection for an unconsenting
party in a presumptively private setting does not impact upon the doc-
trine's fundamental precept that the individual should have autonomy
over his or her body and psyche. Indeed, this concept, properly ap-
plied, can provide remedies for women whose autonomy is violated
within the home.
By removing the only precedential basis for protecting sexual con-
duct in the home, and by declaring that "feminism has had to explode
83. See WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 87-93 (1958).
84. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 211, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis
in original). Interestingly, the right to privacy as elucidated by Douglas provides an alter-
nate basis to the civil right of action I proposed for models whose consent was not mean-
ingfully given. See supra note 22-28 and accompanying text. For example, New York
State's Civil Rights Law § 51 permits an individual to recover damages if another uses
the plaintiff's "name portrait or picture" for commercial purposes without first obtaining
consent. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1992). This statute has been held to
create "a right of privacy" and a corresponding "right of publicity" based upon the right
to privacy doctrine that each individual has the right to autonomy over his or her self.
See Stephano v. News Group Publications, 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984); see also Ippolito
v. Ono-Lennon, 526 N.Y.S.2d 877, 883 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988); see generally Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); PROS-
SER AND KEETON, TORTS 850 (5th ed. 1984). The privacy formulation may even be
preferable to the "one may not profit from one's wrong" approach I have suggested, in
that it need only be shown that the model did not consent to the distribution of the film
commercially, a lower showing than that of coercion or intimidation required to establish
a "wrong." Despite MacKinnon's assertion, I believe that under this approach the right
of privacy can be not only a shield in women's hands, but even a sword.
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the private, ' s5 MacKinnon leads inexorably to the conclusion that
there is no sphere of the individual's life that the state may not touch.
If the personal is the political, as MacKinnon asserts, then the per-
sonal is subject to the regulation of the state. In MacKinnon's
schema, therefore, there is no point at which the individual may cry
"hands off."
Absent a right to privacy, any activity not explicitly mentioned in
the text of the Constitution that the state can rationally find leads to a
harm that the state is empowered to prevent may be regulated or pro-
hibited outright.8 6 Gone entirely from MacKinnon's conception of
privacy are the notions of limited government and institutional dis-
trusts which have largely driven political theory since Montesquieu.8 7
The subordination of government to the individual citizens who cre-
ated it, extending it only those powers which they deem absolutely
necessary to preserve social order with the maximum amount of lib-
erty - all of these quaint notions are discarded in MacKinnon's juris-
prudence. Instead we have a state with the authority to regulate every
component of the individual's life, from the forms of sexual intimacy
they may conduct,88 to the attitudes which they are to have.89 The
85. FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 7, at 191. See supra notes 77-79 and accompany-
ing text.
86. Under this logic, for example, the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), that consensual homosexual intercourse may be rendered
criminal is patently correct, a result which, paradoxically, most of MacKinnon's support-
ers (if not MacKinnon herself) would, it seems, find objectionable. In Neutrality in Con-
stitutional Law, Cass Sunstein condemns Bowers, but likewise rejects the privacy
argument in both the pornography and abortion contexts. Cass Sunstein, Neutrality in
Constitutional Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, Neutrality].
87. See CRICK, supra note 5, at 15-34.
88. FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 7, at 140-43 (analyzing heterosexuality, homosex-
uality and lesbian sadomasochism as victim-victimizer relationships, reaffirming the dom-
inance-submission social model); FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 60-61
(heterosexuality not a choice but "the structure of the oppression of women"), 85-92
(characterizing rape as "very little different from what most men do most of the time and
call it sex"), 15 (lesbian sadomasochists "would sacrifice all women's ability to walk
down the street in safety for the freedom to torture a woman in the privacy of one's
basement without fear of intervention in the name of everyone's freedom of choice"). As
shown, MacKinnon believes that harmful conduct of whatever stripe can and should be
regulated by the state, without reference to the First Amendment or the right to privacy.
89. As has been discussed, a major reason underlying MacKinnon's espousal of the
regulation of pornography is the establishment of an "anti-woman" climate. Professor
Higgins, in concluding Part III of her response, joins MacKinnon in calling for an "ac-
tivist state." Both see the conflict as "women against men who abuse, rape, harass, dis-
criminate against, in short, oppress women." Higgins, supra note 21, at 85. Neither
addresses the issue of why the prevention and punishment of such oppressive behavior
does not provide sufficient redress without the creation of this "activist state" which has
the power to regulate the "tone" of society, extending even to what forms of intimacy
may be conducted or even written about. Absent a right to privacy or right to self-
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state's role in promulgating a sexual orthodoxy and in suppressing
any and all dissenting views90 is a stringently maternalistic one.
For MacKinnon, whose Marxist strain should be noted,91 the state
acts legitimately in fostering attitudes beneficent to equality among
citizens and in suppressing actions and attitudes that deny or interfere
with an egalitarian sense of community, (that is, which "cause harm
that counts"). As with many other Marxists, MacKinnon is uncer-
tain of the course than an equal society, in her terms, would take.92
However, it seems quite clear that the class whose interests she wishes
to advance is an expanded notion of the proletariat - she includes
within it not just women but also victims of racial discrimination,
homosexuals and the working class.93 Despite the sympathy one must
feel with such a goal, MacKinnon's resultant jurisprudence is ulti-
expression, both of which MacKinnon (and, seemingly, Professor Higgins) would abol-
ish, it is hard to see how any form of individual autonomy can be said to exist. While
Higgins refers in a favorable manner to individual autonomy, Higgins, supra note 21, at
87, neither she nor MacKinnon provides an enforceable guarantee of that principle. Un-
fortunately, the cynical wisdom that a right without a remedy is no right at all belies this
alleged support of individual autonomy; absent some method of enforcement, individual
autonomy is unprotected against any depredation Profesor Higgins's "activist state"
might choose to make.
90. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 15 ("In this protection racket of toler-
ance, everybody's sexual bottom line is rhetorically defended as freedom of expression,
which has the political genius of making everybody potentially complicit through the
stirring between their legs. But . . . anyone with an ounce of political analysis should
know that freedom before equality, freedom before justice, will only further liberate the
power of the powerful and will never free what is most in need of expression. If what
turns you on is not your bottom line, and if you understand that pornography literally
means what it says, you might conclude that sexuality has become the fascism of contem-
porary America and we are moving into the last days of Weimar"); Id. at 60-61 (sexuality
compared to jobs under Marxist analysis: "if you even like your work.., does that mean,
from a marxist perspective, your work is not exploited?"). Sunstein argues also for the
suppression of pornography in part because "pornography reflects and promotes attitudes
toward women that are degrading and dehumanizing and that contribute to a variety of
forms of illegal conduct, prominently including sexual harassment." Sunstein, Neutral-
ity, supra note 86, at 25. Revealingly, Sunstein also argues in favor of prohibiting surro-
gate motherhood agreements on the grounds that "[s]urrogacy arrangements, if
widespread, could affect attitudes, on the part of both men and women, about appropriate
gender roles." Id. at 47. Thus, far from the more familiar argument that communicative
actions (such as symbolic speech) are sometimes regulated despite their communicative
content, Sunstein argues that a primary reason for regulating conduct is its likely impact
upon public attitudes - that is, its communicative content.
91. FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 7, at 3-80, consists of a discussion of the relation
between feminism and Marxism and ends with a discussion of the effort to synthesize the
two. While MacKinnon is a feminist before she is a Marxist, she integrates much of
Marxist thought into her own. See also FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 58-61.
92. FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 7, at xiii-xiv, 249.
93. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 55-57. Despite MacKinnon's support
of equal rights for homosexuals, her logic, as explained above, would remove the one
possible constitutional bar to their persecution - the right to privacy. This fact should
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mately totalitarian. It is not, it must be swiftly added, totalitarian in
the sense of the tyrannies of Stalin, Mussolini, or Hitler, but rather in
the sense of Plato's Republic, where the very music citizens may play
and hear is subject to the imprimatur of the state.94 The commitment
to a limited government that is not able to exert such a reach is too
basic to be fought out here. It is sufficient to note that MacKinnon
does not share this commitment.
D. Who May Speak Freely? MacKinnon and the Legitimacy of
Dissenting Views
MacKinnon repeatedly emphasizes that pornography "is not
speech for women," 95 a declaration that is profound in significance. It
should not be simply written off with the flip (although true) reply
that men's speech deserves constitutional protection. This easy an-
swer misses the most interesting feature of MacKinnon's claim. She is
not just adverting to the fact that the speaking done in pornography is
not that of the models or actresses, although that is certainly a part of
her meaning.96 Nor is she referring to the fact that the vast bulk of
pornography is written by and aimed at men, also a part of her obser-
vation. 97 Rather, she asserts that women who write pornographic
materials themselves are not engaged in women's speech, nor are
those women who defend the right to create pornography:
[W]hen women are aroused by sexual violation, meaning we expe-
rience it as our sexuality, the feminist analysis is .. .not contra-
dicted, it is proved. The male supremacist definition of female
sexuality as lust for self-annihilation has won .... [s]exism would
be trivial if this were merely exceptional. (One might ask at this
point not why some women embrace explicit sadomasochism, but
why any women do not).98
For MacKinnon, women's speech is not simply the exercise of wo-
man's right to free speech, whatever it is she chooses to say. Rather,
it is speech which is in the interests of women as a group; which is
feminist speech. Feminist speech has a definition for MacKinnon:
"you will notice that I equate 'in my view' with 'feminism',"99 she
not be obscured because of the regrettable failure of the Court to follow Griswold's logic
in Bowers.
94. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 161-65 (D.Lee ed., Penguin Publishing Co. 1974).
95. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 193-96; FEMINIST THEORY, supra note
7, at 205, 208-11.
96. Id.
97. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 194.
98. Id. at 160-61 (emphasis in original).
99. Id. at 49; see also FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 7, at 117 ("radical feminism is
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once said in an unusual burst of self-perception. Those women who
do not share MacKinnon's view have been tamed by the system:
Women who oppose the civil rights law against pornography are
simply conservative about other things [than are traditional con-
servatives]. When they defend the life they identify with, it is the
sexual status quo they defend .... Acknowledging civil rights for
women in pornography suggests that they are victims of restricted
options on the basis of their sex and that some are directly coerced.
This demeans as victims women who choose to survive through
sexual sale through pure free will .... These women sense a judg-
ment on their lives: that they have gone along with and sometimes
even enjoyed inequality in the sexual sphere. They would rather
live that way forever, and make sure other women do too, than
face what it means, in order to change it. They recommend ap-
peasement. Enforce the bargain, the bargain with their men. They
may one day explain why women and children must be tortured
and abused or no one can freely think, write, or publish.l"
These women, according to MacKinnon, have accepted a stake in the
system; they are "collaborators," or "appeasers," conjuring up images
of Neville Chamberlain's feeble sellout to Adolf Hitler. And, just as
MacKinnon targets men who defend the rights of pornographers,
anti-censorship feminists are vilified by her, their positions distorted
to sound as though they defend rape and torture when in fact only
consensual conduct forms a ground of difference between MacKinnon
and liberals.01 As stressed before, in a liberal jurisprudence, there is
no reason to extend constitutional protection to the commercial ex-
ploitation of an actual rape. 102 Both liberal feminists and "porno-
graphic" women are, in MacKinnon's view, reacting to the social
matrix that seeks to engulf them - liberal women by defending a
sanitized, never-never land version of the status quo, and "porno-
feminism"). That MacKinnon is not always - or has not always been - so dogmatic
should be noted: "I speak as a feminist although not all feminists agree with everything I
say." FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 21.
100. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 226.
101. See FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 13, in which MacKinnon quotes a
female liberal who blamed Linda Marchiano for "let[ting] this happen to her." MacKin-
non is quite right to attack this particular form of imbecility. For liberal feminist writings
concerned with the dangers of pornography yet opposing censorship, see Carole S. Vance,
Pleasure and Danger: Towards a Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: Ex-
PLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 1-27 (Carole S. Vance, ed. 1991). See also Intons-Peter-
son & Roskos-Ewoldsen, Mitigating the Effects of Violent Pornography, in FOR ADULT
USERS ONLY (Susan Gubar & Joan Hoff eds., 1989).
102. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
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graphic" women by giving in to the actuality. 10 3
It is important to note that the argument that pornography is not
women's speech, but rather silences women, has two components.
Beyond MacKinnon's argument that pornography terrorizes women
into silence and that counterspeech cannot be effective, "c4 the concept
that the speech of a woman is anything but women's speech shows her
exaltation of the collective over the individual in stark relief. MacK-
innon sets that speech which - in her judgement - benefits women
as a class apart; only when a woman conforms to MacKinnon's ortho-
doxy is her speech women's speech. Anne Rice's three novels, pub-
lished under the pseudonym A.N. Rocquelaure, do not constitute
women's speech, exploring as they do sado-masochistic sex in various
manifestations, 1 5 nor does her novel, Exit to Eden,"6 under the name
Anne Rampling. Similarly, Pat Califia's writings about lesbian sado-
masochism would be held unprotected. 10 7 But it is more than the
mere holding of such works unprotected that is disturbing; it is the
fact that they are not considered "women's speech." By not fitting
the orthodoxy of feminism as defined by MacKinnon, Rice and Califia
(and others, but two examples will suffice) are seemingly drummed
out of their sex.
It is odd that MacKinnon, who writes movingly of the social costs
paid by Andrea Dworkin and especially by Linda Marchiano in com-
ing forward with their experiences, 1 does not even address the ques-
tion of whether any grace should be extended to the serious artist
(Rice) or the sincere representative of a sexual minority (Califia).
While of course the same questions are presented with regard to their
male counterparts, such as Robert Mapplethorpe, it is especially
poignant that these women face censorship in the name of feminism.
For whatever reasons, Rice's artistic vision"° frequently recurs to
103. See FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 198-206; FEMINIST THEORY, supra
note 7, at 209-12, 314.
104. See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
105. THE CLAIMING OF SLEEPING BEAUTY, BEAUTY'S PUNISHMENT and BEAUTY'S
RELEASE, are all works by Anne Rice. See KATHERINE RAMSLAND, PRISM OF THE
NIGHT: A BIOGRAPHY OF ANNE RICE 213-38 (1991).
106. ANNE RAMPLING, EXIT TO EDEN (1985).
107. For Pat Califia's writings as cited by MacKinnon, see FEMINIST THEORY, supra
note 7, at 142. Califia has also published a collection of avowedly pornographic short
stories with a revealingly candid introduction under the somewhat unfortunate title of
MACHO SLUTS (1989). I emphasize these examples as being the most stark and favorable
to MacKinnon, but others (Anais Nin for example) exist.
108. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 132-33.
109. Use of sado-masochotic imagery can be found in Rice's vampire trilogy as well.
See, e.g., INTERVIEW WITH THE VAMPIRE 238, 245 (1976); see also THE VAMPIRE LES-
TAT 157 (1985) and especially THE QUEEN OF THE DAMNED 376 (1988). While all three
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what MacKinnon would term pornography, and Califia too had to
decide whether to be an honest writer or a politically correct one.' 10
MacKinnon, in the name of women, would choose for these women
- by the blunt instrument of the law. The individual woman is si-
lenced in the name of providing free speech for women - a paradox if
ever there was one.
Paradoxical or not, MacKinnon seeks to empower some vague, uni-
form collective called women (or, to steal a term from other radical
feminists, "womenspirit") by silencing not just men but individual
women who are not in tune with this collective spirit."' Our system
of jurisprudence honors dissent.' 1 For MacKinnon dissent is an evil
to be crushed." 3
Perhaps the most genuinely chilling aspect of MacKinnon's
thought is her belief that silencing all opposition is the correct method
to liberate women. She claims that pornography tyrannizes women
and silences them:
I learned that the social preconditions, the presumptions, that un-
derlie the First Amendment do not apply to women. The First
Amendment essentially presumes some level of social equality
among people and hence essentially equal social access to the
means of expression. In a context of inequality between the sexes,
we cannot presume that that is accurate. The First Amendment
also presumes that for the mind to be free to fulfill itself, speech
must be free and open.... [P]ornography contributes to enslaving
women's minds and bodies. As a social process and as a form of
"speech," pornography amounts to terrorism and promotes not
volumes were popularly successful (the first two especially), they have also received high
esteem from critics. See RAMSLAND, supra note 105, at 314-15.
110. "We live in fear of being known, and such fear stifles the nascent erotic wish
before the image of what is wished for can be fully formed. We know we are ugly before
we have even seen ourselves and the injustice of this,'the falsehood, chokes me .... I
could keep my sexuality private ... [T]hat involves telling a lie of omission-becoming
invisible as a pervert; assuming an undeserved mantle of normalcy and legitimacy."
MACHO SLUTS, supra note 107, at 9. While many might feel empowered to sit in judge-
ment of Califia's lifestyle and writings, I can only admire her courage, and her candor.
111. In FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 7, at 40, MacKinnon writes: "Liberal feminism
takes the individual as the proper unit of analysis and measure of the destructiveness of
sexism. For radical feminism, although the person is kept in view, the touchstone for
analysis and outrage is the collective (group called women).... In radicalism, women is a
collective whole, a singular noun .... [I]n radical feminism [the personal comprises the
collective]." Id. at 40.
112. For an enlightening view of the American tradition of honoring dissenters (in
theory if not always in practice), see STEVEN H. SCHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE (1991).
113. This viewpoint does not go directly to the constitutional validity of the ordinance
but provides a chilling vision of the goal that MacKinnon hopes to reach through its
enactment and enforcement.
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freedom but silence. Rather, it promotes freedom for men and en-
slavement and silence for women.... [u]nder conditions of sexual
dominance, pornography hides and distorts truth while at the same
time enforcing itself, imprinting itself on the world, making it itself
real. 11
4
Thus, silencing their oppressors will liberate women. The way to pro-
mote equality is not counter-speech, as Justice Brandeis would have
it," 5 but the oppressing of the oppressor. For MacKinnon, the condi-
tions under which counter-speech can be effective do not exist because
pornography undermines women's credibility when they do speak and
terrorizes them into not speaking at all. 116
This logic creates the danger that not only pornographers should be
silenced, but any speaker whose message is deemed by MacKinnon to
be harmful to the interests of women as well. Slippery slope argu-
ments are usually the last refuge of the desperate academic, but this
one has already been borne out by the facts. Much of what MacKin-
non would permit to be banned might well be deemed to have literary,
artistic, or political value, as was noted earlier. Moreover, MacKin-
non and Dworkin have demonstrated their willingness to silence those
who merely advocate the rights of pornographers. In the political
process of passing the Minneapolis ordinance, for example, MacKin-
non and Dworkin manipulated the hearings and the procedure by
which the ordinance was passed in such a way as to totally disable
dissent. " 7
114. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 129-30.
115. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
116. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 132.
117. See DOWNS, supra note 12, at 65-87. While there are many examples given by
Downs to this effect (neglect by the ordinance's proponents of concerns of black political
action groups, liberal feminist groups, etc.), I have selected a few of the more appalling
examples of "steamrollering" by the ordinance's proponents to discuss here. While some
opposing voices were heard, they were unable to prepare thoroughly due to the unprece-
dented speed with which the ordinance was pushed through, and the difficulty of acquir-
ing a copy of it. According to Matthew Stark, "until about a day before the city council
voted on it, [nobody ever] gave us a copy of [the ordinance]. We asked for it, but [they]
kept playing games.... [F]or a period of a month or more, we didn't have anything." Id.
at 85. The selection of witnesses and their questioning were ceded to MacKinnon and
Dworkin, who made sure that witnesses were properly guided, as was Edward Donner-
stein, a leading researcher on the social effects of pornography. Mr. Donnerstein was
discouraged from qualifying his remarks. Id. at 84. MacKinnon shifted roles from that of
advocate to that of expert hired by the council whenever it suited her purpose. Id. at 79-
80, 84-85. Needless to say, as the questioning was left to the authors of the ordinance, no
cross-examination was permitted. Id. at 80-83. Finally, when any of the unprepared,
uninvited opposition did get to testify, they "were drowned out by the antics of the se-
lected audience." Id. at 82. It is not difficult to guess by whom the audience was selected.
Shouting down opponents is a favorite tactic of MacKinnon's and Dworkin's supporters;
Harvard Professor Alan Dershowitz described the difficulty he encountered when, in the
1992]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
It seems clear from these silencing tactics, when combined with the
speed with which the ordinance was pushed through and the difficul-
ties they created in evaluating the ordinance, that Dworkin and
MacKinnon strove to avoid any consideration or discussion of the
ordinance. Rather, they sought to secure its passage, regardless of
whether it expressed the will of the people. For Donald Alexander
Downs, MacKinnon's abusive tactics of "steam-rollering" her opposi-
tion is a regrettable lapse by a passionate true believer, who in her
excessive zeal, seizes upon unworthy weapons. I contend that these
tactics are rather implicit in her underlying theory. The idea that an
oppressed minority can be empowered by silencing its oppressors and
those who defend the rights of the putative oppressors, legitimizes the
tactics of oppression, and indeed perhaps mandates them.
It is MacKinnon's contempt for the political process, evidenced by
her manipulation of her role as a consultant and her willingness to
disenfranchise political opposition, which supports the conclusion
that she is a totalitarian. Not only does she reject the notions of free
speech and of zones of individual freedom from government intrusion,
she is willing to short-circuit the democratic process in such a way
that only her view is aired. The will of the people is to be formed,
manipulated by one-sided presentation and "guided" in the direction
MacKinnon wishes it to move. In short, the political process becomes
nothing more than a rubber stamp for already reached conclusions.
For MacKinnon, democratic self-rule, political rule, has no value of
its own."'8 By any standards, the elimination of privacy, the disen-
franchisement of all potential opposition 1 9 and the emphasis on atti-
course of a debate with Dworkin, her supporters sought to shout him down whenever he
spoke. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 18, at 190-91.
118. See FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 7, at 157-60.
119. Indeed, even liberal feminists are discredited by MacKinnon. FEMINIST THE-
ORY, supra note 7, at 117 ("radical feminism is feminism"). That liberal feminists, such
as June Callwood, felt their concerns were ignored by the Dworkin-MacKinnon group in
the Minneapolis political process is especially compelling evidence of the consequence for
MacKinnon of not being with MacKinnon 100 percent: your opinion becomes irrelevant,
something to be brushed aside. See DOWNS, supra note 12. To be less than a total sup-
porter is to be a collaborator, or traitor as shown above. For liberal feminist views
against censorship (which I have sought not to echo), see WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP
(Varda Burstyn, ed., 1985); Nadine Strossen, The Convergence of Feminist and Civil Lib-
erties Principles in the Pornography Debate, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 201 (1987). For perhaps
the most appealing, and gentlest, feminist critique of MacKinnon, see Ruth Colker, Femi-
nist Consciousness and the State: A Basis for Cautious Optimism, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
1146 (1990). While Professor Colker is (in my view) unduly laudatory of MacKinnon,
her critique of her conclusions within a shared feminist perspective, as distinguished from
my own liberal, pro-feminist framework, is hard to resist. Colker also valuably points out
the dangers of intolerant, disrespectful rhetoric on both sides of this debate, a pitfall
which is often difficult to avoid. Id. at 1169-70. Interestingly, Professor Higgins will
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tude correction by the state can only be regarded as totalitarianism.
The allegedly benevolent nature of the totalitarians, who seek to cre-
ate a society in which equality and mutual respect would be at a pre-
mium, but liberty would be a thing of the past, does not alter the
nature of the society that they seek to build.
IV. Why Protect Speech That Harms?
The fact that MacKinnon's political principles, which inform the
model ordinance, are starkly different from those taken for granted in
the American system does not, of course, completely undercut the
ordinance. MacKinnon does raise the $64,000 question of First
Amendment jurisprudence: why, in heaven's name, do we protect
speech that causes harm? 120 The essential question of why we regu-
late the incidental harms which accompany speech (mob violence, for
example) but do not regulate speech that directly inflicts harm upon
individuals or upon society as a group, is usually evaded.
Surely MacKinnon is right and the uttering of racist slurs is as
much an injury as the violence that may be provoked by such slurs.
Why must we wait for the Klan to become physically violent or for
the American Nazi Party to actually assault Jewish citizens, and not
recognize that the man or woman hearing diatribes against "niggers"
or threatened with the gas chambers (which they may have barely
avoided in their youths) has been injured as much as if punched or
kicked.12' Indeed, the United States is almost alone among the na-
tions in the extent to which we protect speech whose very utterance
inflicts injury. 122
allow that there are possibly "good reasons - feminist reasons - for opposing such
regulation" of pornography. Higgins, supra note 21, at 77 n.2. While Professor Higgins's
willingness to allow for differences among feminists is an improvement on MacKinnon's
inflexibility, I find her implicit belief that the only valid reasoning is feminist reasoning
profoundly troubling.
120. MacKinnon herself does not ask the question, as we have seen, claiming that we
do not avowedly protect speech that causes harm, but rather that our definition of causal-
ity is too narrow. This is a misapprehension. Much speech may cause various styles of
harm; only that harm that presents a clear and present danger of illegal conduct has been
regulable from (essentially) the dawn of First Amendment jurisprudence. See Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The Brandenburg test that is now in effect requires
even more to permit suppression; not simply that harm may occur, but that direct and
imminent lawlessness will ensue, and that it is intended.
121. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (invalidating ordinance
discriminating among "fighting words" and prohibiting those promoting racial, sexual
and ethnic biases).
122. For example, the British have the Race Relations Act. The American failure to
ratify the European Convention of Human Rights is attributed to its anti-hate agitation
provisions which are violative of the First Amendment.
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The pornography issue is an especially apt one for posing such a
general theoretical question in a concrete and emotionally compelling
context. While the empirical evidence is not perfectly clear in estab-
lishing a causal relationship between pornography and sexual violence
and anti-women attitudes,1 23 at the very least a reinforcing and legiti-
mating of such attitudes seems reasonable to presume. It seems like a
worthwhile exercise to accept MacKinnon's and Dworkin's evidence
of harm and still ask the question: should pornography be deemed to
be protected speech, and if so is there a better reason than simply that
the First Amendment compels us to do it?1 24
Nonetheless, the kind of harm involved must play a role in the dis-
cussion. Other than the direct harms, which plainly can be appropri-
ately regulated, the harms that MacKinnon asserts flow from
pornography boil down to essentially this: people will believe it.125
Men especially will believe it, and act on it. Pornography's message,
MacKinnon asserts, pervades society, leading to a devaluation of wo-
men and their objectification.1 26 MacKinnon's contention that this
breed of harm is one against which we must be protected is not simply
at odds with over seventy years of First Amendment jurisprudence, it
violates every one of the rationales underlying the First Amendment.
These rationales seem to have as their unifying theme the need for a
123. Again, I have no intention of being exhaustive (or anywhere near it) on this topic,
especially as I will be accepting MacKinnon's proposition arguendo. However, a few
citations to empirical views disputing those cited by MacKinnon include ALAN SOBLE,
PORNOGRAPHY (1986) (an especially interesting view as it comes from an author sharing
MacKinnon's Marxist bias); WALTER KENDRICK, THE SECRET MUSEUM 231-35 (Pen-
guin Books 1988); ALAN DERSHOWITZ, TAKING LIBERTIES 200-02 (1989).
124. Before proceeding, it would be well to narrow the field of discussion, by pointing
out once again that it is only the attitudinal harms which may be protected by the First
Amendment. The direct or overt harms are plainly appropriate grounds for suppression
of the materials, civil liability and criminal prosecution. See supra notes 22-28 and ac-
companying text. Insofar as she points out the lack of energetic and sympathetic use of
these legal weapons against direct harms, MacKinnon performs a valuable public service.
125. In view of Professor Higgins's claim that the reason we permit regulation of com-
mercial speech is that people will believe its falsehoods, Higgins, supra note 21, at 87, I
must hasten to add that I am not assuming a divinely implanted ability on the part of the
American citizenry to discern empirically false statements of physical reality - such as
how many caplets is an appropriate dosage, or are cigarettes really good for one's diges-
tion. Nor am I postulating that each and every American can be trusted to be psychically
aware of the truth or falsity regarding every tabloid story regarding the British Royal
Family. Rather, I am postulating that in a democratic republic value choices are left up
to each individual. Professor Higgins's statements concerning libel and commercial
speech reveal far more than her use of the rhetorical technique of reductio ad absurdum.
Professor Higgins displays a distressing elitism by treating such issues, where correct
information must be given to the public for fear of their being duped, as comparable with
the crucial philosophical and ethical framework of which each citizen must be his or her
own sole arbiter.
126. See, e.g., FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 7, at 204-05.
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democratic-republican state to presume the ability of its citizens to
make rational choices.1 27
V. The Pornography Question and the Rationales Underlying the
First Amendment
A. The Centrality of the Pornography Issue
My contention that the treatment of pornography is central to the
meaning of the First Amendment and not just an issue at the fringe of
the jurisprudence is one shared by none other than Catharine
MacKinnon:
First Amendment absolutism was forged in the crucible of obscen-
ity litigation. Probably its most inspired expositions, its most pas-
sionate defenses, are to be found in Justice Douglas' dissents in
obscenity cases. This is no coincidence. Believe him when he says
that pornography is at the core of the First Amendment ...
[P]ornography's protection fits perfectly with the power relations
embedded in First Amendment structure and jurisprudence from
the start. Pornography is exactly that speech of men that silences
the speech of women. I take it seriously when Justice Douglas
speaking on pornography and others preaching absolutism say that
pornography has to be protected speech or else free expression will
not mean what it has always meant in this country. 128
While MacKinnon claims that her ordinance fits within the First
Amendment's requirements, plainly it is positing a far less protective
test, allowing censorship based on content-based harm in addition to
incidental or contextual harms.1 29 It is, quite simply, an effort to re-
ject the content neutrality requirement and to replace it with a far
broader test.1 30 The approach is of course quite in line with MacKin-
non's rejection of neutrality or objectivity as a male form of thought,
an epistemology which supports the status quo by presuming to set
out what is, without noting the fact that what is, is the result of male
127. A distinction can be drawn between speech such as pornography, which com-
municates a world view in which is contained its harmful impact - that and the possibil-
ity of its impact upon its audience - and hate speech in a one-to-one setting, where it is
not part of a political or other social message, but simply used as a psychic weapon
against the victim. In this context, again the utterance of the speech causes harm, but not
in a context where its status as an attempt to persuade or to influence legitimizes it; the
psychic assault is the only purpose of the speech. What the Constitution mandates in
such cases is a separate issue which needs its own exposition.
128. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 208-09.
129. Id. at 191-95.
130. For a discussion of the application of traditional First Amendment jurisprudence
to MacKinnon's ordinance and her justifications of it, see supra notes 35-74 and accom-
panying text.
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dominance. By being neutral about what is, MacKinnon asserts, the
liberal tradition legitimizes it.13 '
MacKinnon's willing concession that the treatment of pornography
is an issue at the core of our liberal (in the classical sense of the word)
First Amendment tradition provides a useful starting point for analy-
sis. To her, it shows the fatally flawed nature of that tradition. But
the rationale of the First Amendment as explicated by Justice Doug-
las provides an alternative view, a potent rejoinder to MacKinnon.
What Justice Douglas asserted was the primacy of the individual over
the government. As early as 1958, he wrote that:
Government exists for man [sic], not man for government. The
aim of government is security for the individual and freedom for
the development of his talents. The individual needs protection
from government itself-from the executive branch, from the legis-
lative branch, and even from the tyranny of judges .... There is,
indeed, a congeries of these rights that may conveniently be called
the right to be let alone.' 32
Later, he would become fond of the phrase that the Constitution was
designed to "keep the government off the backs of the people."'' 33
At least one major corollary can be found in this valuation of the
individual and his or her primacy over the government: under any
justification for free speech, we must be presumed to have the ability
to accept or to reject ideas. The notions that free speech leads to the
elucidation of truth,13  or that it promotes and serves democratic
rule, 35 or that it develops the sort of citizenry which we desire; 36 all
of these notions - and indeed any defense of free speech not content
to rest on slippery slope grounds - must presume that people as indi-
131. FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 7, at 83-105.
132. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 87 (1958) [hereinafter
DOUGLAS]; see also WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE ANATOMY OF LIBERTY 2 (Ruth Nanda
Anshen ed., Pocket Books 1964) [hereinafter LIBERTY]. ("Men [sic] do not acquire
rights from the government; one man does not give another certain rights.... They come
to him because of the divine spark in every human being."); WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS,
POINTS OF REBELLION (1969).
133. See, e.g., WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975: THE AUTOBI-
OGRAPHY OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS ix (1980).
134. See JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), in MILTON'S AREOPAGITICA (H.B.
Cotterill ed., 1952); see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22-30 (Norton Critical ed. 1975).
135. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1 (1971); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
FREE GOVERNMENT (1948); Harry Kalven, Jr. The New York Times Case: A Note on
"the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, " 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191.
136. Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis
Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1988); LEE C. BOLLIN-
GER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986).
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viduals are competent to rule themselves, that they are able to reach
rational decisions. And for that to be true, they must be able to dis-
tinguish truth from falsehood.
B. Historical Rationales for the First Amendment
All of the various articulations of a single rationale for free speech
have in this sense fallen short of the mark. It has been argued -
though with differing doctrinal results - that the speech with which
the First Amendment is concerned is that which forms a part of polit-
ical discourse. Both Alexander Meiklejohn and former Judge Robert
Bork have advanced this rationale, which leads strongly to the con-
clusion that only speech on explicitly political subjects is protected by
the First Amendment. While Meiklejohn sought to bring artistic or
literary speech into the ambit of this rationale, as shaping the atti-
tudes that citizens carry with them into the voting booth,I37 Bork cor-
rectly pointed out the weakness of this view, noting that "[o]ther
human activities and experiences also form personality, teach and cre-
ate attitudes just as much as does the novel, but no one would...
[bar] regulations of economic activity, control of entry into a trade,
laws about sexual behavior [!], marriage and the like."' 38
Harry Kalven, Jr., tended to agree with Bork and Meiklejohn but
hedged his bets; he declared the abolition of the crime of seditious
libel to be the "core function" of the First Amendment, but did not
rule out existence of other Values served by it.139 He also, acknowl-
edging the difficulty of the position, sought to extend protection be-
yond solely political speech."4
Another major strain in First Amendment theory has asserted that
freedom of speech helps mold the citizenry's character in a desirable
fashion, whether by inculcating courage, as desired by Justice Bran-
deis, 4 ' or tolerance, the virtue adverted to by Dean Lee Bollinger.'42
In either case, the character-building rationale is subject to various
criticisms, the most fundamental of which has been made by Vincent
Blasi:
[T]he premise that government should try to shape the 'intellectual
character' of the citizenry has disturbing overtones ... [i]t is the
ambitious and comprehensive catechism that Bollinger wants
137. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 135, at 99-100.
138. Bork, supra note 135, at 27.
139. Kalven, supra note 135, at 208-209.
140. Id.
141. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see
supra note 57.
142. BOLLINGER, supra note 136.
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taught that gives me pause. For he seeks an educational experience
that will influence the way persons conduct themselves across a
wide range of social interaction. He speaks not of lessons or
precepts but of character formation. '43
The same charge is applicable, though to a lesser extent, to Brandeis.
Even without such a comprehensive scheme of instruction, the no-
tion that the First Amendment's value is anchored to a notion of indi-
viduals needing to experience the tutelage of the state is contrary to
the common sense understanding which most people share that free-
dom is a good thing in itself. People do not seek freedom, people do
not revolt against tyranny, simply because they want a substitute
teacher. There is something deeply anarchic in humanity that longs
to be answerable to no will but its own. This streak is balanced by the
countervailing need to find not only security but reinforcement in
others. The effort to accommodate these inconsistent - indeed con-
trary - needs makes up much of political thought. Even the most
conformist of us wishes to be perceived as an individual; even the
most independent seeks some degree of community. Moreover,
neither theory sufficiently differentiates speech from other forms of
conduct. No doubt the setting of a good example is a helpful side
effect of the First Amendment, but it will hardly do as a primary
purpose.
The third major strain involves the search for truth. Free speech,
Milton alleged, will invariably lead to the discovery of the truth, for
"who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encoun-
ter?"" This justification was also employed by John Stuart Mill in
his classic On Liberty.4 ' It was employed in a very different form by
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in, most famously, Abrams v. United
States.146 In perhaps the most famous passage in the United States
Reports, Holmes wrote:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good de-
sired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the
143. Vincent Blasi, The Teaching Function of the First Amendment, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 387, 414 (1987) (reviewing BOLLINGER, supra note 136).
144. AREOPAGITICA, supra note 134, at 45.
145. See supra note 134.
146. 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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theory of our Constitution.47
Holmes did not repose any confidence in the unfounded faith that
"truth will out" on which Milton and Mill place such reliance. In-
deed, in Milton and Mill, this faith in truth seems naive, lacking
awareness of the frequently compelling power of error. When seduc-
tive but incorrect views are held by the majority, it bears down upon
the fledgling dissenter with all the power of the human herd instinct,
employing at least the power of non-legal forms of social coercion
such as ridicule and ostracism. Holmes seems to many to be rooted in
an absolute skepticism in the experience of truth, and finding that
majority rule is the only way one can arrive at working "truths."'' 48
But he seems to me to be saying rather that free speech, which allows
both points of view to go on the record and be preserved, is the only
means of insuring that any errors we do make can be rectified in time.
It is rather reminiscent of C.P. Snow's view that "it is an error, of
course, to think that persecution is never successful. More often than
not, it has been extremely so... [For example, Manicheism] would
not have been known to exist except for the writings of its enemies. It
was as though communism had been extirpated in Europe in the
1920's and was only known through what is said of it in Mein
Kampf."149 Insights that may benefit humanity, whether from posi-
tive or negative examples, can be forever lost, making it difficult if not
impossible to trace errors and to set them right. Indeed, the loss of
such insights could make the detection of errors not of the grosser
kind impossible. Thus, to allow for the possibility that one of our ex-
periments will fail, and that we may have to retrace our steps, Holmes
defends the right of free expression even of thoughts we believe to be
"fraught with death."'I5
147. Id. at 630.
148. See, e.g., David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doc-
trine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1310-11 (1983); Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the
Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 719, 733 (1975); Yosal Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 213
(1964).
149. C.P. SNOW, THE LIGHT AND THE DARK 39 (1947). The anti-pornography move-
ment seems to have just that sort of oblivion in mind for the thought that it hates, if Cass
Sunstein's view is any indication: "we could imagine a society in which the harms pro-
duced by pornography were so widely acknowledged and so generally condemned that an
antipornography ordinance would not be regarded as viewpoint-based at all." Sunstein,
Neutrality, supra note 86, at 29. In other words, the general acceptance of an orthodoxy
does not simply legitimate it, it deprives its opposite of existence - which Sunstein ap-
pears to welcome.
150. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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C. Freedom of Speech: An End in Itself
Not only can the search for truth rationale be undermined as sug-
gested above, it additionally lacks backing as an empirical proposi-
tion. It also seems to seriously underestimate the power of
propaganda and social duress falling short of law. And in Holmes's
"safety catch" form it certainly lacks the emotional sweep to justify
Harry Kalven's description of the First Amendment as the most char-
ismatic provision of the constitution. 5' The same critique can be
made of entirely negative justifications, such as distrust of government
power and the slippery slope argument.152 The individual autonomy
argument, as Bork showed, proves too much, leaving no rational
grounds to distinguish between speech and other actions which pro-
vide self-gratification. 153
What, one begins to ask in desperation, is left to justify our almost
intuitive perception that free speech is a good thing to have, and that
the First Amendment - leaving aside all doctrinal questions of limit
and interpretation for just a moment - is a worthwhile enactment?
The answer is: all of the rationales advanced above. That no one of
these rationales provides a completely satisfying justification for free-
dom of speech is hardly surprising; nothing so basic to our society can
be summed up so easily. Each of the rationales offered provides at
least one key value served by the First Amendment, but not its com-
plete raison d'etre. Despite the undermining of each rationale that has
occurred in academic circles, they have all been a part of the discus-
sion since Milton's Areopagitica. This fact, and the passionate alle-
giance each of the justifications commands from top-flight intellects
throughout the evolution of the jurisprudence points, like Janus, in
two directions. Either the First Amendment serves a host of discrete
(although not inconsistent) values, of which no synthesis is possible or
even desirable; or all of these value claims can be harmonized. It is
the latter contention that attracts me.
It seems plain that Douglas' vision of the individual's primacy over
the government and his or her right to self rule is derived from the
"self-evident truths" upon which our government is based: "that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights .... That to secure these rights, Govern-
151. Kalven, supra note 135, at xii.
152. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521 [hereinafter Blasi, The Checking Value] (more than a mere slippery
slope argument, but an essentially institutional view of the First Amendment, arguing
that its purpose is in preventing abuse of official power); Vincent Blasi, The Pathological
Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985).
153. Bork, supra note 135, at 27.
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ments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed."' 54 As Justice Douglas comments on this
provision of the Declaration of Independence, its theory grounds le-
gitimate government "not from on high, not from a king, but from the
consent of the governed." 155
Thus, the single over-arching rationale of the First Amendment
must be a statement of the nature of the relationship between govern-
ment and citizen. The very nature of a democratic-republican form of
government is that the people are presumed to be capable of self-rule.
And in order to be capable of self-rule, as indicated before, a people
must be able to distinguish between good and evil, true and false, wis-
dom and prudence. If the people - as individuals - are not able to
make personal decisions about reading or viewing, how can they be
assumed to be able to choose representatives, and make difficult and
key policy decisions. Privacy doctrine, part of which is embodied in
the First Amendment in that it denies the government access to a
zone of self which each individual retains, is required by the very no-
tion of democratic-republic government. If "we the, people" are to be
sovereigns, in any sense of the word, the government must be bound
to respect the dignity and right of every citizen to rule over his or her
own life. If the state need not honor the dignity of the individual by
acknowledging his or her right within broad contours to control his or
her own life, how can we be said to enjoy self-rule? It is the failure of
Bork and Meikeljohn to perceive this which leads them into an unnec-
essarily narrow view of the First Amendment's scope.1 56
VI. Pornography and the First Amendment
Couched in such general terms, the argument is not of crystalline
clarity. It will perhaps gain in momentum as applied to the concrete
instance of pornography.
One threshold objection must be met before proceeding to that
analysis, however. After all, critics could retort, it is plainly not some
nameless, faceless government which imposes laws upon the citizenry,
but rather the citizenry itself, or at least representatives of a majority
of them. Why cannot the people themselves democratically decide to
delimit the areas of permitted debate? As long as democratic process
is observed, and each citizen can vote, surely there is nothing un-
154. PREAMBLE, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
155. LIBERTY, supra note 132, at 2-3.
156. Kalven almost intuitively avoids this problem by committing to a core function of
the First Amendment rather than an exclusive one. This is not the first time his unwill-
ingness to oversimplify has served Kalven well. Kalven, supra note 135, at 208-09.
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democratic about regulation of available ideas by the democratically
elected majority, whatever else might also be wrong with such
regulation.
Certainly, the electorate can pass laws regulating ideas by invoking
the amendment process, if all else fails. Such a change, however,
would constitute a restructuring so fundamental that it would no
longer be accurate to describe the resultant system as a democratic
republic. Any citizenry whose government can limit its exposure to
ideas to those which are acceptably orthodox and agreeable to the
government, can no longer can be said to exercise ruling power. It
simply rubber stamps the actions of the government that shapes its
views, its morals, its aesthetics and its agenda. While democratic-re-
publican inform, in fact such a system would be oligarchical, with the
governed's role limited to that of selecting between alternatives ac-
ceptable to the ruling class. Such a government is but a hollow mock-
ery both of democracy and of republicanism.
The notion that we can govern ourselves requires that we be free to
explore, question and challenge the status quo in every walk of life. It
is for this reason that the Declaration of Independence explicitly pro-
vides for the right to rebel against a government that no longer suits
the needs of the people.'1 7 So too the people have the right to annul
the revolution by amending the Constitution or altering the system in
any other way they see fit. That right includes the replacement of a
democratic government with a more authoritarian one. But such an
alteration should be done in the open, with the consent of the people,
as required by the amending process, and not by "interpreting" the
Constitution in such a way as to change the system's fundamentals
sub silentio - which is what I believe the MacKinnon-Dworkin ordi-
nance seeks to do.
The effort to regulate against attitudinal harms caused by pornogra-
phy stands on a completely different footing than the effort to provide
compensatory and punitive sanctions against direct harms. The real
question posed by attitudinal harms is not whether someone shall be
held liable, but rather who shall be held liable - the pornographer,
the abuser, or both?
Holding the pornographer liable for the uses to which men put his
or her product clearly can be distinguished from holding him or her
157. This line of thought, and the notion of the continuing precedential power of the
Declaration of Independence owes much to Charles L. Black, On Reading and Using the
Ninth Amendment, in THE HUMANE IMAGINATION 196-99 (Woodbridge: OxBow Press
1986); see also BLACK'S STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1983).
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liable for contributing to a social atmosphere conducive to the subor-
dination of women; both provisions of the ordinance do, however, vio-
late the same dignitary concern, that expressed by Milton in his
metaphor of the schoolboy:
What advantage is it to be a man over it is to be a boy at school, if
we have only escaped the ferula to come under the fescue of an
Imprimatur? if serious and elaborate writings, as if they were no
more than the theme of a grammar lad under his pedagogue, must
not be uttered without the cursory eyes of a temporising and ex-
temporising licenser? He who is not trusted with his own actions,
his drift not being known to be evil and standing to the hazard of
law and penalty, has no great argument to think himself reputed in
the Commonwealth wherein he was born for other than a fool or a
foreigner.... If in this the most consummate act of his fidelity and
ripeness no years, no industry, no former proof of his abilities can
bring him to that state of maturity as not to be still mistrusted and
suspected... must appear in print like a puny with his guardian
and his censor's hand on the back of his title to be his bail and
surety, that he is no idiot or seducer, it cannot be but a dishonour
and derogation to the author, to the book, to the privilege and dig-
nity of learning.158
Like Milton's schoolboy, we are presumed to be irrevocably sullied
and forced into acting in manners we would normally be proof against
by exposure to ideas. Such logic has been the principal motivation of
the censor for as long as there has been censorship. As Walter Ken-
drick points out in Tbe Secret Museum, the fear that especially vul-
nerable audience members, conceptualized by Charles Dickens as
"The Young Person," would be completely overcome by pornography
has dogged potential censors: "The most troublesome thing about the
Young Person," he writes, "- I call her 'she' because Dickens did,
though boys and men could be equally obstreperous - was that she
persisted in taking representations for reality. Monkey-see-monkey-
do was her only imperative."' '15 9 While by no means the earliest such
hysterical broadside, one of the most typical expressions of such fear
can be found in this anonymous plaint: "[t]he matter was of such a
leprous character that it would be impossible for any young man who
had not learned the Divine secret of self-control to have read it with-
out committing some form of outward sin within twenty-four hours
after." 1"
While MacKinnon claims to have eliminated the moral content and
158. AREOPAGATICA, supra note 134, at 27.
159. KENDRICK, supra note 123, at 68.
160. Id. at 87.
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base of obscenity regulation, 16 1 the notion that pornography is essen-
tially coercive, that it causes its readers to act in ways in which they
would not, within a tight temporal framework, is highly reminiscent
of this early critic of Emily Zola. As Kendrick points out, MacKin-
non and Dworkin replace the frail, corruptible (generally female)
Young Person with one of their own: "[T]heir new Young Person - a
brutal, low-minded male or indeed any male at all - was only a
weirdly transmogrified version of a fantasy that, in the past, had abet-
ted the oppression of the very people (women) who now wished to
appropriate it."'1 6 2 The gentleman who paternalistically sought to
protect weak boys and women - and the poor who could not "handle
it" - has given way to the maternalistic feminist who "still desires to
prevent the ignorant and vicious from obtaining access to dangerous
representations, and this desire still masks a lust for power. The fe-
male gentleman, however, feels himself disenfranchised; power al-
ready belongs to the ignorant and vicious, and it must be wrested
from them, though without changing the nature or structure of power
in the slightest degree."' 163
Contrary to Justice Brandeis' eloquent and seminal opinion in
Whitney v. California,' the Brandenburg rule'6 5 is not based solely
on the insight that in so constricted a time frame between the speech
and the act, counterspeech cannot be effective. Rather, the imminence
requirement uses the time factor as one probative of whether the audi-
ence member has become an instrument of the speaker's will, the only
context in which the First Amendment prohibits advocacy of unlaw-
ful acts. 166 If mere temporal inability to avert harm by counterspeech
was the test, then the Brandenburg court's imposition of an added
prerequisite - that it be the speaker's intent to cause unlawful ac-
tion-does not make sense. When the Brandenburg test is fulfilled,
however, the speaker-audience relationship is very like that of princi-
pal-agent. The audience member is, at the behest of the speaker, act-ing.167 That the inflamed audience member does not have time to
consider his action, or to be talked out of it, or reason it out for him or
herself, cements the agency relationship, making the action more
161. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 146-63.
162. KENDRICK, supra note 123, at 232.
163. Id. at 239.
164. 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) ("[i]f there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence").
165. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
166. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
167. See MAY, supra note 55.
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truly that of the speaker. Counterspeech - or time for consideration
- gives the individual the choice to be rational, to decide whether or
not the action will be hers or whether she will refrain.
The Brandenburg test permits suppression only in those cases
analogous to the criminal obeying orders from a superior in the illegal
hierarchy. The fact that those orders came in the form of speech does
not make them protected by the First Amendment, as they are
"speech brigaded with action.""16  That is, the orders - and the
speech that passes (or should it be flunks?) the Brandenburg test -
are the functional equivalent of action and are intended to be so. The
master criminal who claims that his henchman is not subject to his
will in carrying out his orders, who claims that the fact that his physi-
cal action in the deed was only speech, is as disingenuous as Elizabeth
I when she claimed that she did not kill Mary Stuart since her only
act was that of signing the execution warrant. By speaking to one
subject with her authority, with the intent that the subject would act,
and knowing that this intent would be understood as mandatory, not
permissive in nature, Elizabeth acted to kill Mary as plainly as if she
had wielded the axe. So too the "flunker" of the Brandenburg test,
whose knowledge of obedience comes not from the ability to disci-
pline that the master criminal or monarch possesses, but from being
himself or herself part of the dynamics of the crowd. Every speaker
firmly in the saddle can feel the audience's agreement, and can see its
development into a mob, consonant with his or her intent. The
speaker becomes so aligned with the crowd that it becomes fair to
attribute the crowd's conduct to him or to her. 69 By continuing to
push for the desired result, the speaker takes the action upon him or
herself. This intent, according to Brandenburg, must be actual and
not presumed. 70
In pornography, intent to incite is almost surely missing and tem-
porality is certainly absent. The harms MacKinnon deals with, even
under her scenario, are a reinforcement and generation of attitudes
over time. The rapist with the pornographic novel in his pocket (proof
by the way, as if it were needed, that MacKinnon does not, as does
168. See, e.g., DOUGLAS, supra note 132, at 54-57 (explaining this concept in depth).
169. This is not to say, as Professor Higgins appears to construe the argument, that
"people must be presumed to be capable of self-rule ...except when they are not."
Higgins, supra note 21, at 86. It is not the incapacity of the crowd to resist the will of
Svengali which renders the speaker's language actionable. Rather, it is the speaker's con-
tinuing affiliation with the mob in spite of knowing what will result if the inflammatory
speech continues. By shouting "let's kill" to an audience that the speaker knows is will-
ing, able and ready to obey, the speaker may be said to deputize the audience to do his or
her will.
170. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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Cass Sunstein 17 1 distinguish the written word from photographs or
drawings) has had plenty of time to pore over it and similar materials.
MacKinnon's assumption that the reader or viewer of some book or
film is incapable of choosing to accept or reject the attitudes embodied
in the presentation is extraordinarily degrading. 172 It also ignores the
degree to which the audience for pornography is self-selected; adult
bookstores are quite clear about their contents. Moreover, the stares
of passers-by no doubt make the would-be purchaser's decision to
enter a self-conscious one for all but the most hardened of habitual
consumers. MacKinnon's fundamental assumption that we are
"Young Persons" in the parlance of Kendrick may be partially true,
in that already extant attitudes may be buttressed or eroded by re-
peated voluntary exposure to the message of pornography. Nonethe-
less, such a half truth as MacKinnon advances and which lies behind
most arguments, feminist or not, for the censorship of pornography,
flatly denies the possibility of democratic self-rule. 173
171. Cass Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 616-
19. Sunstein's claim that speech that contains non-cognitive appeals may be more easily
regulated than purely rational speech ignores the immense power of symbolic speech,
which by definition does not appeal to the intellect. Yet such speech is an integral part of
human communication, as the Supreme Court has long recognized. See Tinker v. Des
Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The Supreme Court has, in recognizing the value
of such speech, noted that the right to free speech is the right to communicate effectively,
and has permitted only regulation that goes to the conduct component of speech. See
Texas v. Johnson 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (protesters' First Amendment rights prohibit state
from proscribing only "disrespectful" flag burning"); see also Eichman v. United States,
496 U.S. 310 (1990)(invalidating federal statute protecting national flag against politically
motivated burning). As Vincent Blasi points out, symbolic "conduct deserves a high
degree of constitutional protection. [The] kind of stimulus necessary to activate the polit-
ical conscience of [the] populace sometimes can be created only by transcending rational-
ity and appealing to more primitive basic instincts." Blasi, The Checking Value, supra
note 152, at 640. Winston Churchill's appeal to "fight [them] on the beaches" and his
offer only of "blood, toil, tears and sweat" were not appeals to rationality, but they were
nonetheless the finest kind of political speech: an appeal to the spirit of the nation. WIN-
STON CHURCHILL, BLOOD, TOIL, TEARS AND SWEAT: THE SPEECHES OF WINSTON S.
CHURCHILL 149, 165 (David Carradine ed. 1989).
172. Professor Higgins asks why this assumption is more degrading than "the Court's
assumption [under the Brandenburg circumstances] that a crowd may be swept out of
control by a speaker." Higgins, supra note 21, at 86. Possibly because no such assump-
tion is made; the crowd members are no less guilty of riot for all the exhortation they
have heard. Rather, the speaker is presumed to have desired the violence and to have
participated in it in a manner not unlike that of a principal in an agent-principal relation-
ship. To switch metaphors, the speaker is like a conspirator whose co-conspirators have
performed the overt act of rioting, and who thus is liable for the resulting violence. See
GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 218-25 (1978).
173. Professor Higgins argues that "pornography does not harm through the expres-
sion of ideas but through the noncognitive sexualization of domination, the creation of an
addiction to a violent sexual practice. Understood this way, the consumption of pornog-
raphy is a sexual practice, not an idea about sexuality." Higgins, supra note 21, at 86
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The fundamental tenet of politics in a democratic-republican sense
is that human beings are capable of rational thought, and of choosing
right from wrong. If this is not true with regard to the most intimate
and basic of human relations, how can it be true of federal-state rela-
tions, or of foreign relations, or of any of the other realms in which
the people are assumed to be fit to rule? If the people are in fact not
fit to rule themselves as individuals as well as collectively, to govern
their own lives, then self-government is impossible and we had better
abandon the whole hypocritical enterprise of giving them the vote and
institute a full scale regimen of social conditioning based on the most
humane, psychologically effective and cost-effective technology. We
will be with B.F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity.'74 After all,
pornographic materials are not the only ones that inculcate on a sub-
rational level harmful attitudes whether leading to violence or other
harms. 75 Rambo, Birth of a Nation, most of Wagner, and the col-
lected works of Friedreich Nietzsche inculcate values most progres-
sive people - including feminists and Marxists - would consider to
be abhorrent, and they do it in a way that is similar to that of pornog-
raphy: they deliver a message while we are emotionally engaged,
whether iai the rapture of music, or caught up in the narrative swirl of
a "cracking good yarn."
The First Amendment is not without costs, and has never been
(emphasis in original). As has already been pointed out, not only rational speech is wor-
thy of First Amendment protection. See supra notes 164-68. More fundamentally, the
mechanistic model of human behavior postulated by MacKinnon and Higgins - that
exposure to pornography leads inexorably to the twisting of one's attitudes and views into
a pornographic role - is belied by their own experience. Andrea Dworkin's book POR-
NOGRAPHY, supra note 1, is replete with detailed analyses and plot summaries of pornog-
raphy, yet the author's revulsion at what she describes is clear. Thus, at least one
response outside of the mechanistic model is possible.
174. B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971) (psychological text pos-
tulating that personality is the product of environment and that conduct can be deter-
mined by psychological conditioning).
175. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 18, at 293-95. Indeed, many crimes have been attrib-
uted to the "inspiration" of popular media presentations; the attempted assassination of
then-President Ronald Reagan by John Hinckley, Jr. was based upon the youth's obses-
sion with Martin Scorsese's film TAXI DRIVER; Nathaniel White based his first murder
on a scene from the film RoBoCoP II; the well regarded film THE DEER HUNTER con-
tained a Russian Roulette scene said to have inspired similar incidents; similarly, a 1987
shooting and subsequent attempted suicide by a department store employee was derived
from an episode of Star Trek. See Imitators Under the Influence of Art, NEWSDAY, Au-
gust 10, 1992, at 38. All of these people emulated actions portrayed in the media with
lethal results, yet no cry to ban Star Trek or to sue Gene Roddenberry's estate for "caus-
ing" the fatality has resulted. Seemingly, Americans believe that there is something
about sex, as opposed to mere violence, that makes it special - a distinction premised
more on a hangover of Victorian prudery, I suspect, than on any reasonable grounds.
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thought to be. Ideas do present a danger to the status quo.17 6 Justice
Holmes was deadly serious when he wrote that "every idea is an in-
citement." '177 He recognized that in ideas are tremendous force, po-
tential for good and for destruction. Was a man who had spent his
entire life as a devotee of philosophy likely to protect free speech only
because it came without serious risks? While always delighted to
point out, as he did in Abrams, the tendency of those empowered by
the status quo to hysterically exaggerate the dangers posed by dissent,
Holmes, in the last analysis, firmly believed that ideas wield the great-
est might:
Thus only can you gain the secret isolated joy of the thinker, who
knows that, a hundred years after he is dead and forgotten, men
who never heard of him will be moving to the measure of his
thought - the subtle postponed power which the world knows
not, but which to his prophetic vision is more real than that which
commands an army.178
Holmes, give him his due, believed that if proletarian dictatorship was
to win the assent of the majority, it should have its way, much as he
despised it.179 For he recognized that revolutionary system, one
whose very base was in armed revolution, could scarcely be credible if
it denied the people the right to change the course of society.
If we posit, with MacKinnon, that the receiving mind is without
power to evaluate, and to reject or oppose ideas, then in truth democ-
racy is itself a sure path to destruction. If we do not so posit, then the
fact that a man or men may act upon abhorrent doctrines or attitudes
cannot, in a democratic republic, form the basis for attributing liabil-
ity for such actions to the preacher of these doctrines outside of the
most narrow of circumstances, the circumstances captured in the
Brandenburg rule.
The notion of the state that censorship postulates is a related but no
less chilling factor. How can we be free if sexual orthodoxy and
images are to be proscribed by law? If the state can reach into our
bedrooms and tell meaningfully consenting adults (unlike children
who are blanketly protected by the parens patriae role of the state)
what may constitute proper forms of sexual intimacy, then there is no
truth to Theodore Roosevelt's description of an American as The Free
Citizen. 180 The establishment by law of such a sexual orthodoxy turns
176. Indeed, even MacKinnon writes: "[plornography is ideas; ideas matter." FEMI-
NISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 223.
177. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
178. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 32 (1921).
179. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
180. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE FREE CITIZEN, (H. Hagedorn, ed. 1958).
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us from self-ruled individuals to creatures of the state, with our every
move subject to that state's pleasure. That the state is comprised of
our neighbors alters this not a jot but adds to the ignominy of our
position. We are not asked to give up authority to some wise Solon or
to Platonic Guardians, but rather to people no wiser or more inher-
ently virtuous than ourselves. The result of this denial of individual
sovereignty is that even our sexual identities and intimacies become
the property of our neighbors.
If we are not in some spheres of our lives beyond the state's reach,
however benevolent its purposes, then we exist for the state, not it for
us. One would think that MacKinnon, who advocates the rights of
some sexual minorities (homosexuals and lesbians), would know bet-
ter than to seek the persecution of others (sado-masochists) and the
regulation of the sexual majority (heterosexuals).
An interesting discussion - and one which I will presently forgo
- can be found in the curious insight that MacKinnon's thesis, that
people cannot parse pornographic materials and themselves interpret
and evaluate them, not only undercuts our theory of government but
undermines the guilt of the rapist himself. If the rapist cannot help
being influenced by pornography and is powerless to reject its message
is not his culpability diminished almost down to nothing? He is a
mere tool of the pornographer as well as a victim in his own right.
MacKinnon's assertion that rape is endemic - that all but 7.8 per-
cent of women have been raped or otherwise sexually harassed (a fig-
ure which she does not, unfortunately, break down) becomes even
more troubling than it is in its own right. 8" Is our society truly ruled
by a form of mind control that leads systematically to the brutaliza-
tion of half of the population? Worse yet, are we to be treated to the
"Penthouse defense" in addition to the Twinkie defense?1 82
We suppose in our criminal justice system that free will exists, if
only within the confines of unalterable circumstances, accidents, and
subject to the impact of other wills similarly free, if only to a similarly
limited extent. Such a supposition can after all be challenged, but
does not that challenge run aground on our own intuitive experience
of free will? Moreover, the only way free will can exist is if we give it
rein. Unguided by society, not subject to holistic piloting in the name
of our group benefit, a similacrum of freedom can be found. To ac-
181. See FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 6 n.18; see also supra notes 107-111
and accompanying text (MacKinnon's discussion of Califia).
182. The defense proffered by Dan White for his assassination of Harvey Milk, the
"Twinkie defense" was that consumption of the Hostess confection in bulk had altered
his body chemistry to the extent that he was not responsible for his actions.
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cept B.F. Skinner's insight (and Mark Twain's as well, surprisingly)1 3
is to give up on the precious notion of individual freedom and dignity.
A political commitment to these beliefs, even if it flies in the face of
empirical reality, can help to make them true, or at least to leave open
the possibility of their coming true. After all, if we are so subject to
conditioning, can we not condition ourselves into individuality? Un-
less we suppose so, we reduce ourselves to Pavlov's dogs, slobbering
on cue, and reduce our literature to that which is fit for the mentally
incompetent. It is not that we do truly live lives of unfettered individ-
uality, immune from the impingements of our culture; rather it is that
only by minimizing the extent to which our culture impinges upon
our individuality can we taste what little freedom is possible, a free-
dom made all the more precious by its limitations.
VII. Conclusion
Do I really mean to assert that the passage and upholding of the
MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinance would sound the death knell of indi-
viduality and free will? Of course not. No single act will signal the
end of American civil liberties. But this ordinance, and its precenden-
tial potential, are deeply foreign to the fundamental tenets of our
political system, and can only help in their erosion. The sacrifice of
freedom in the name of equality will deprive equality of its benefits;
what comfort is it to know that we can all be equally oppressed? In-
deed, even demogogues can sometimes perceive this; Huey Long once
said that if fascism was to come to America, it would come disguised
as a quest for equality. 8 4 This apt warning is not the last word on
which to leave Catharine MacKinnon and the feminist movement to
ban pornography. Rather, Justice Brandeis' more tolerant and wise
words seem apposite:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. [Those]
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty
by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insid-
ious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding. "5
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